TheraminTrees’s Atheism, 3: Evil

Direct continuation of: TheraminTrees’s Atheism, 2: Omniscience

Recently, I’ve taken a strong liking to a series of YouTube videos by user TheraminTrees called “There are no gods”, that set out to explain what TheraminTrees used to believe about gods, and why he is an atheist now — including which gods he rejects, why, and with how much certainty. Thus I’ve decided to write a blog series of my own detailing his arguments in text, analyzing them, and pointing out where they can be made even stronger. The end result is a comprehensive and cumulative case for atheism.

Currently, I’m still analyzing the second video in his series, which is about the types of gods he can definitively reject because they are logically impossible. He does this by incompatibility arguments, which demonstrate that certain god concepts have logically contradictory properties — just like we can’t have a “square circle”, we can’t have an omnibenevolent god that allows the existence of Hell, an omnipotent god that is incapable of sin, a god that involves libertarian free will, an omniscient god who gets surprised or upset.

 

 

Another incompatibility argument that TheraminTrees advances is mentioned rather briefly in the video, but deserves a large amount of analysis: The Problem of Evil.

Those familiar with this site have seen me pound my head against this issue in a lengthy three part essay “The Great Problem of Evil”. Then, cl of The Warfare of Mental wrote a rebuttal, which I summarized in “Revisiting the Problem of Evil, Part I”, which was discontinued in favor of a debate that started strong and then fell apart for a variety of reasons unrelated to the Problem of Evil itself. In between all of that, I wrote a two-part conclusion series “Is God Good, Part I”.

Now, if I already wrote three metric crap tons of stuff on the Problem of Evil, why belabor the point further? The answer is simple: I messed up earlier, and I want to correct my mistakes. I need to set the record straight, because I misunderstood a lot of the key concepts earlier, and I now regularly see atheists misunderstand a lot of what is going on. So I’m going to start from the very beginning and defend my newer thesis: The Problem of Evil does undermine theism, but (probably) not for the reasons you think.

 

 

What is the Problem of Evil?

First, it probably helps to understand what the Problem of Evil is. Most broadly, the Problem of Evil is any incompatibility argument that demonstrates that God is incompatible with the existence of evil, usually taken to be a conflict between a property of omnibenevolence, all-lovingness, and/or moral perfection and something incompatible with that, like suffering.

However, this expands the Problem of Evil to include many potential incompatibilities, like the previously mentioned conflict between Hell and Omnibenevolence, and the not-yet-mentioned-here-but-well-dealt-with-elsewhere conflict between biblical malevolence and Omnibenevolence, Satan and Omnibenevolence, and perhaps even Divine Hiddenness and Omnibenevolence and Prayer and Omnibenevolence!

Typically, all of that is seen as overly broad. Thus, the Problem of Evil is often made specifically about an incompatibility between the suffering caused by nature and our fellow humans in today’s world, thus not counting Hell, Biblical events, Satan, an overly hidden God, and prayer.

 

The Typical Problem of Evil

The typical Problem of Evil usually works like this:

P1: “God” refers to an entity that is omniscient (knows everything that is logically possible to know), omnipotent (capable of doing anything that is logically possible), and omnibenevolent (will always act to prevent the existence of suffering).

P2: Suffering exists (consider the suffering of nonhuman animals and babies with birth defects).

C3: Therefore, God cannot exist.

 

However, since then multiple problems have been raised against this argument. First, the existence of theodicies have indicated that while we may suffer, our suffering is justified because we achieve a higher good, or because God couldn’t remove that suffering without causing greater or equal amounts of suffering to occur. Thus P2 is unjustified.

Many people have pointed out what these higher goods / unavoidable evils might be, and these are called theodicies.

Secondly, others have argued that we simply aren’t knowledgable enough to look at the world and infer why God acts the way he does — for all we know, God could be acting for a higher good that we just aren’t capable of understanding. This is called Skeptical Theism.

Lastly, Other people criticize P1 by saying that God is not actually omnibenevolent, and/or suggesting that omnibenevolence does not actually consist of “always acting to prevent the existence of suffering”.

 

The Reformulated Problem of Evil

In response to these arguments, we can modify our Problem of Evil. This argument is inspired by William Rowe’s 1979 paper “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”. I’ve given each premise a cool name so that they’ll be easier to talk about, as I’ll be mentioning each premise quite frequently:

  • Theological Premise: “God” refers to an entity that is omniscient (knows everything that is logically possible to know), omnipotent (capable of doing anything that is logically possible), and omnibenevolent (definition provided in the next premise).
  • Omnibenevolence Premise: An “omnibenevolent” entity will always act to prevent the occurrence of any instance of suffering, unless (1) it is not within the entity’s power to do so, (2) such an action would cause the loss of a higher good, or (3) such an action would cause the realization of a greater or equal suffering.
  • Seemingly Evil Premise: It seems as if at least one instance of suffering exists such that (1) it is within God’s power to remove, (2) such action would not cause the loss of a higher good, and (3) such an action would not cause the realization of a greater or equal suffering. (Consider the suffering of nonhuman animals and babies with birth defects.)
  • Actual Evil Premise: It is indeed the case that at least one instance of suffering exists such that (1) it is within God’s power to remove, (2) such action would not cause the loss of a higher good, and (3) such an action would not cause the realization of a greater or equal suffering.
  • Bridging Premise: If Seemingly Evil Premise is true, Actual Evil Premise is true.
  • Conclusion: Therefore, from Theological Premise, Omnibenevolence Premise, Bridging Premise, and Actual Evil Premise, God does not exist.

 

This argument contains three key changes:

First, the Seemingly Evil Premise takes into account all theodices, and suggests that even if we take into account the existence of suggested higher goods (theodices), we still can find instances of suffering which look unjustified.

Second, we take into account Skeptical Theism by noting that there is a difference between suffering that just look like they’re unjustified and suffering that is actually unjustified when we take into account all the information that God knows that we do not. The Bridging Premise then argues that despite the Skeptical Theist argument, we are still in a position to know that some suffering truly exists. I really like making this bridge explicit and obviously stated, because most Problem of Evil arguments I’ve seen really try to hide this step. I feel it is important to be upfront about your argument’s potential weaknesses.

Third, to take into account people’s different ideas of definitions, the definition of benevolence has been separated into a second premise that needs independent defense.

Now, let’s look at some counterarguments in far more depth…

 

 

The Theological and Omnibenevolence Premises vs. Definitions

Not all concepts of god actually are considered to be omnibenevolent — certainly, gods like Loki and Hades never were, and the Wiccan gods also aren’t! Thus it’s very easy to deny Theological Premise with a different theology. While such theologies are in the minority, they still do exist today, and must be considered. However, all this means is that this incompatibility argument doesn’t rule out all gods, it merely rules out gods that have the incompatible properties.

Secondly, one might deny the Omnibenevolence Premise by suggesting that being omnibenevolent does not consist in stopping suffering, but rather in doing something else. Perhaps these people suggest that whatever God does is omnipotent because he is the very standard of morality himself! While I find this approach to morality unsatisfying in my long series starting with “The Meaning of Morality”, it seems enough to just grant them the failure of the Omnibenevolence Premise but deny they’ve done anything significant. Instead, they’ve merely gotten confused over definitions.

What I mean by this is just because you call something “omnibenevolent” doesn’t mean anything if the word refers to something else. While it would confuse people endlessly, there’s no rule of logic that says I can’t define “omnibenevolent” as synonymous with potato, or “that which always acts to bring about suffering in cruel ways”. All I’ve done is construct gods that simply lack the incompatible property.

Thus, I concede that for some god concepts, the Theological and/or Omnibenevolence Premises fail. Thus the Problem of Evil does not disprove the existence of all gods, or prove atheism. The Problem of Evil just cuts some potential god concepts away, and we’ll have to get the remainders in a later essay. However, we can continue for the majority of god concepts for which these premises are true. Carrying on…

 

 

The Seemingly Evil Premise vs. Theodicies

An even stronger shot is to deny Seemingly Evil Premise by suggesting that there does not seem to be any evil that (1) it is within God’s power to remove, (2) such action would not cause the loss of a higher good, and (3) such an action would not cause the realization of a greater or equal suffering. In response, some people argue that there are specific higher goods that can be identified which justify all suffering we observe.

Thus in order to demonstrate the Seemingly Evil Premise, we need to identify one instance of suffering for which no theodicy can succeed. Given that the amount of theodices are so numerous, I do not want to discuss them all here. Instead, I offer the following:

First, the two examples I picked (nonhuman animal suffering and the suffering of babies by birth defects) were handpicked specifically because they dodge nearly all popular theodices. Both examples involve no actions that arose by free will, contain no sin to be punished, are not necessitated by any fundamental physical laws, involve no opportunities for life lessons or character building, involve no opportunity to be drawn closer to God, involve suffering to complicated to meaningfully eliminate, and do not involve anyone going to heaven.

Second, I point out problems with each theodicy I mentioned in my opening statement of the Cl – Peter debate.

Third, I offer the comment section of this essay to ask me to deal with any theodicy you can think of that is relevant to my two examples and that you don’t think I have properly addressed elsewhere.

 

While that settles theodices for now, it’s also really important to note that some suffering can be justified even if it is entirely avoidable by humans, for God might have had to allow for the possibility of suffering, such as allowing us to freely choose choices that harm us, or allow the existence of criminals to give us something meaningful to try and stop. While I don’t think these theodices succeed at the end of the day, it indicates that it is not true that if God exists, removing any instance of suffering must make the everyone net worse off. Thus, I hereby recant all the essays I wrote in which I argued this position.

 

 

The Bridging Premise vs. Skeptical Theism

Now for the strongest attack against this argument, suggesting that Bridging Premise is false, and just because it looks like some suffering is needless to us doesn’t mean it actually is, because we’re not omniscient ourselves and thus don’t have the same grasps of higher goods as God does. This argument is made most famously in Steven Wykstra’s 1984 article “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering”.

Basically, it goes like this: Consider looking in a garage, and looking around. After about five minutes of looking, you realize that (1) you don’t see any bears and (2) you don’t see any microbes. Thus you conclude that there is (1) no bears in the garage and (2) no microbes in the garage. Clearly (1) is valid while (2) is not, and the inference to unjustified suffering is far more like (2) than like (1).

The reasoning here lies in the difference between (1) and (2), because we have no reason to think that microbes are the kind of things that we can see, whereas bears are definitely the kind of thing we can see. Thus even though we can observe instances of suffering that seem extensively horrendous and are not justified by any theodicy that we can think of, does not mean that such suffering is truly unjustified, because we have no reason to think that the justification is the kind of thing we can see. God is just that much beyond us.

This makes sense, and it seems that Skeptical Theism is very damaging to the Bridging Premise — we simply do not have the knowledge to know whether these things are truly unjustified, or even say that the justification is unlikely. Thus we are arguing “I don’t see any reason God would allow this suffering”, and expecting that to matter, when really we aren’t in any position to draw a conclusion from our personal lack of insight, just like the person who doesn’t see germs.

Thus the Problem of Evil, as traditionally conceived, fails. However, if we take Skeptical Theism a bit further, perhaps we can break it… In the next essay, we’ll aim to do just that.

Continued in: TheraminTrees’s Atheism, 4: Skeptical Theism

Followed up in: Cl, Bubonic Plagues, and Bibles, Part I and My List of Theodicy Responses

-

Author’s Note: This essay was first revised on March 27 in response to comments given in the comments section. The essay was then again revised on May 13, in response to Cl’s essay “Why I Said Skeptical Theism is For the Birds”. Because of the added length, I cut this essay into two halves.

-

I now blog at EverydayUtilitarian.com. I hope you'll join me at my new blog! This page has been left as an archive.

On 21 Mar 2012 in All, Atheism, Problem of Evil. 73 Comments.

73 Comments

  1. #1 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    22 Mar 2012, 2:16 am  

    God wouldn’t leave us high and dry, unable to discern the existence of him from the universe we can see.

    How is this conclusion immune to your concession that God’s purposes may be beyond us? Maybe God isn’t so enchanted with scientific reason. Maybe some people come to believe in God because good souls tend to; other people disbelieve for reasons of faith rather than rationality? Why would a good God necessarily think the universe better if people could intellectually discern his existence? Maybe that would make it too easy: if God’s existence were rationally ascertainable, everyone would behave and believe just to get to heaven, and that’s not what God intends; rather, he intends a more severe test.

    In short, I think you’re on stronger ground when you denied skeptical theism. (We have both changed positions: I had contended earlier, as you do now, that skeptical theism survives direct scrutiny because our inability to understand God is built into the problem of an omnipotent God.)

    The reason pure argument often goes nowhere is often that assessing the inherent plausibility of a contention can be very difficult. Thus, despite “ideologically” favoring the belief that unnecessary suffering exists, it seemed to me that the God hypothesis was inherently capable of explaining it away, on account of God’s omnipotence and advanced consciousness. What I omitted is an objective appraisal of plausibility. Such an objective appraisal is very skillfully conducted by Thinking Emotions in his two-part “Skeptical Theism” series (starting at http://tinyurl.com/7hmzy72)

    This is closely related to my discussion with Joseph about solipsism. Joseph says solipsism is indistinguishable from “common sense”; you now say theism is indistinguishable from atheism.

    But you don’t say that consistently. You also say a benevolent God wouldn’t leave us in the dark! Thus, the contentions are distinguishable on the ground that a theist world would reveal God transparently.

    This seems correct, but not any stronger than invoking the gamut of anti-skeptical-theist arguments. It seems clearly weaker to rest the case on this one prediction about what God would plausibly do.

    This all comes down to issues in the theory of evidence. If you’re a Bayesian, your reasoning must be based on the likelihood God exists or doesn’t given the evidence (unless it’s a purely logical argument). Your argument that God would reveal himself is an argument lowering the likelihood that God exists given the evidence (that evidence being that he doesn’t reveal himself). But it is no better, and I think somewhat weaker, than the argument that a world filled with unavoidable natural disasters is an improbable world for a benevolent God to have created.

    Plausibility (the likelihood ratios) can be difficult to evaluate even in science. It is an inauspicious point at which to try to make dispositive arguments acceptable to those who disagree. But insofar as one limits oneself to a plausibility argument, the Philosophical Fog essay shows the way to a balanced, considered view of what’s plausible.

    There are deeper, more interesting questions about the nature of “plausibility,” and why it should conduce to truth. Occam’s razor really only cuts it in special cases where truly additional assumptions are made. Kolmogorov is probably too language dependent to operationalize plausibility. Nonetheless, our sense of plausibility is our evolutionary gift; intellectual honesty is the necessary precondition for deploying it over controversial terrain. Plausibility is an imperfect guide to truth, but ultimately, it’s all we have.

    In any event, you’ve got to look at plausibility, rather than say that the existing world is equally probable under theism and atheism just if it isn’t logically inconsistent with either. And that’s what you do when you say God wouldn’t hide things. That’s not a logical consequence of theism, and other observations are equally relevant to evaluating the plausibility of divine benevolence given the existing evidence.

  2. #2 cl says:
    22 Mar 2012, 12:45 pm  

    Peter, no offense, but knowing your skill level I was expecting something fresh and challenging. This is just the same old appeal to incredulity redressed. Your “Bridging Premise” is unjustified. All you’re doing is saying, “It seems X, therefore X,” but that was precisely the point of contention in our debate.

    Like your other argument, this one also commits one to doubting God’s existence simply because they stubbed their toe. It seems to me that there’s a lot of work to be done in order to secure such a conclusion.

  3. #3 Peter Hurford (author) says:
    22 Mar 2012, 12:55 pm  

    Cl, thanks for the compliments. However, I think I may have been unclear in my final two sections, because I made it clear that I agreed with you that the Bridging Premise is unjustified via Skeptical Theism, but then demonstrated that Skeptical Theism commits us to some very startling new problems, which I called the “Three New Problems of Evil”.

    I’ll probably edit it for further clarity in light of Stephen R. Diamond’s comment and maybe ThinkingEmotion’s “Why You Should be Skeptical of Skeptical Theism, Part 2″.
    But my point was this:

    There are only three responses to the Problem of Evil: (1) concede God is not as described, (2) provide a group of theodices to explain all suffering, (3) adopt Skeptical Theism.

    I agree that if you adopt Skeptical Theism, you do not need to provide a theodicy, but you’re now committed to having no evidence for God’s omnibenevolence, and have problems with evil and/or deceiving gods.

  4. #4 cl says:
    22 Mar 2012, 1:10 pm  

    Peter,

    However, I think I may have been unclear in my final two sections, because I made it clear that I agreed with you that the Bridging Premise is unjustified via Skeptical Theism, but then demonstrated that Skeptical Theism commits us to some very startling new problems, which I called the “Three New Problems of Evil”.

    My bad. You were clear. I didn’t read you clearly… hang tight.

  5. #5 cl says:
    22 Mar 2012, 2:11 pm  

    I’ve got an idea: would you like to make this the focus of DBT02? No judges, no word counts, no rules, no criteria, no time limits, no points… just raw, free from intellectual sparring until common ground is reached or one party concedes.

    If so, we could each make announcements on our own blogs, and I’ll consider this your opening statement (unless of course you’d like to revise it). And, to keep things tidy, I’ll post my stuff on my blog, you post your stuff on yours. That way we won’t have any duplicates laying around, and neither of us will have to do the extra work maintaining duplicates requires.

    Watcha think?

  6. #6 cl says:
    22 Mar 2012, 2:31 pm  

    Also, although I’m more than happy to do the “letter” format debate similar to DBT01, I’m equally open to doing this in “real time” format. We could just set a date and time, and devote an hour, or two, to going back-and-forth in the comments section. We could start at my blog, where I’ll ask questions related to your post here, then, the next session would be here, then the next at my blog… etc.

    The only guideline I would ask for in such a format would be clear “yes” or “no” answers where applicable, followed by caveats should they exist. For example, if I were to ask you, “Peter, would a good father provide nice things for his children,” you MUST answer either “yes” or “no,” followed by a caveat if necessary.

    Your thoughts?

  7. #7 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    22 Mar 2012, 4:57 pm  

    Peter,
    If you’re going to commit the folly of another debate, the only way such a debate might make a contribution is to have it be about epistemology/philosophy of science, focusing on the so-called argument from incredulity. The fallacy designated is a crude error. An example: someone ignorant of quantum physics declares some physical proposition is false because the incredulous party just doesn’t know the physics. It is closely related to the “argument from ignorance.” Theists have expanded the concept by conflating it with the obligation to reply to the special circumstances posed by the existence of a mysteriously powerful being whose purposes might necessarily be obscure. This is a specific theist argument: it doesn’t assert the incredulity fallacy, which, in any event, isn’t well-defined, at best a vague guide in informal logic, not a principle of formal logic. (This distortion is in some ways analogous to those who seek to turn every insult into an “ad hominem fallacy.”]

    The theism you’re confronting lives in skeptical theism and obtains its nourishment from the fallacy of the alleged fallacy of incredulity. If you don’t confront a position where it lives and as well as deprive it of its nourishment, you condemn the discussion to confusion. Plus, you personally need desperately to think through the theory of evidence; everybody does. So many shibboleths from the past that imperfectly may current understandings.

  8. #8 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    22 Mar 2012, 5:23 pm  

    Why does God’s failure to reveal himself transparently on a quotidian basis demonstrate that there’s no way to know anything about God? What if God revealed himself in the past. If he directly inspired the Bible; if he appeared to Moses; performed miracles as Christ. What if we could conclude that, although God might be a trickster, he doesn’t lie.

    It seems to me that you assume that suffering is the only possible evidence we might have of God. That’s the problem to be explained, not the only source of evidence. God’ word (so called) might also serve as evidence, as well as other data: for example, the wholly benevolent Christ character.

  9. #9 cl says:
    22 Mar 2012, 6:00 pm  

    Mr. Diamond,

    So many shibboleths from the past that imperfectly may current understandings.

    Hmmm… what exactly were you trying to articulate there?

  10. #10 cl says:
    22 Mar 2012, 6:39 pm  

    Mr. Diamond,

    Why does God’s failure to reveal himself transparently on a quotidian basis demonstrate that there’s no way to know anything about God?

    It seems to me you’ve missed the point. May he correct me if I’m wrong, but this isn’t what Peter’s said. He’s said that the appeal to skeptical theism, that is, the appeal to “God’s mysterious ways,” cuts both ways, meaning we can’t know anything about God’s goodness, either.

    I don’t find it persuasive—then again I don’t find skeptical theism persuasive, either—but in the interest of accuracy you should at least understand what he’s actually saying.

    Also, a matter of style. Elsewhere, you condemn verbosity, but if that’s the case, why not just use the common word “everyday” instead of “quotidian?” It seems to me that a writer with genuine interest in avoiding verbosity would strive for simpler language, especially when it can convey the same point. Are you trying to sound sophisticated or something?

  11. #11 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    22 Mar 2012, 7:59 pm  

    Peter,

    On the fallacious doctrine of the fallacy of incredulity, there’s maxim defending it: the absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence. Yudkowsky criticizes it at http://tinyurl.com/ybl99xn

    There’s a great deal on the Internet on this step, which is still one-step removed from best understanding, which requires seeing that the maxim is incoherent: there’s really no such thing as the complete absence of evidence.

    Not much at that level is posted. If you develop the argument and link it to the so-called fallacies of credulity and ignorance, there’s room for making a contribution.

  12. #12 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    22 Mar 2012, 8:02 pm  

    So many shibboleths from the past that imperfectly <i.may current understandings.

    Should be map

  13. #13 Charles R says:
    22 Mar 2012, 8:37 pm  

    the two examples I picked (nonhuman animal suffering and the suffering of babies by birth defects) were handpicked specifically because they dodge nearly all popular theodices.

    These were two that did it for me.

  14. #14 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    22 Mar 2012, 8:46 pm  

    One other related distinction that really needs development, which you could attend to, is the distinction between inconceivability arguments and arguments to the effect that “I can’t conceive…” Actually, both are misunderstood. “I can’t conceive” *is* evidence, but it is weak, often very weak. It’s “inconceivable”–I think there’s a philosophical literature on this, and the conclusions aren’t very accessible. You could review that and put it together.

    [If this is in the wrong folder, please feel free issue and reprimand or remonstrance. I concede justification in advance, as I don't know where it should go.]

  15. #15 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    22 Mar 2012, 9:25 pm  

    These were two that did it for me.

    Yes, they’re excellent choices, but I thought the comprehensive treatment Philosophical Fog provides more persuasive than focusing an the strongest ones. I suppose that reflects my sense that this is a cumulative case.

    We say did it for *us*, but is this something subjective? That’s a rhetorical question, as I think the answer is complex, but it’s a nice question.

  16. #16 cl says:
    22 Mar 2012, 10:23 pm  

    I’ve never bought much into this “absence of evidence is evidence of absence” thing. Many moons back, we had an absence of evidence for literally thousands of claims that are accepted as true today. “We have no evidence for this weird thing called quantum mechanics,” says an hypothetical Greek philosopher. Okay, well… need I really point out the futility of such thinking? To return to Peter’s example, the pre-Pasteur observer has no evidence of germs in her garage (or microbes or whatever), and a “Bayesian” would seem committed to the proposition that this “absence” is evidence of germicidal / microbial absence—but that’s not true! So doesn’t it seem that the “absence of evidence is evidence of absence” retort isn’t a very reliable guide to truth?

    Also, it would actually be false that there was an absence of evidence for germs / microbes. The evidence was there, we just couldn’t see it. Same deal with asteroids and “cathode rays.” This is why I still maintain that, “I can’t see / imagine / conceive X” doesn’t amount to a hill of beans. We need something stronger if we wish to compel the rational.

  17. #17 Charles R says:
    22 Mar 2012, 11:25 pm  

    I’ve never bought much into this “absence of evidence is evidence of absence” thing.

    For any hypothesis H and event E, if P(H|E) > P(H), then P(H|~E) < P(H). Translation: if E makes H more likely, then its absence makes H less likely. This follows from, P(H) = P(H|E)*P(E) + P(H|~E)*P(~E) and P(E) + P(~E) = 1.

  18. #18 cl says:
    23 Mar 2012, 1:41 am  

    I read the post. It’d be more helpful if you could help me with the real world examples I left.

  19. #19 Charles R says:
    23 Mar 2012, 3:28 am  

    I think the math speaks for itself.

  20. #20 Tom Mitchell says:
    23 Mar 2012, 10:12 am  

    Hey Peter,

    In regard to your “Three New Problems of Evil,” if you were to debate against a logical theist, who was at or near your level, then I see you winning on 1) and 2), but losing on 3). For 3) to be a valid criticism you are first burdened with proving that libertarian free will is not good. Without this prerequisite, 3) cannot stand alone. If you were to have a debate, I would suggest that the morality of libertarian free will should be its focus.

    That said, what interests me most about this essay is what is presumed by the following sentence

    …which demonstrate that certain god concepts have logically contradictory properties — just like we can’t have a “square circle….”

    The duality between squares and circles represents a core assumption of western philosophy, and perhaps its most prevailing fallacy. Namely, that reality is constituted by isolate structures (essences/objects) rather than a continuity of process.

    Also, just for fun: above you say that “we can all agree the earth is round.” But the earth is covered with sharp ridges and mountains. Abstractly, it is round, but it also contains many squareish attributes. The earth is your square-circle.

  21. #21 cl says:
    23 Mar 2012, 1:29 pm  

    Charles R,

    Cool, then I guess you’re not interested in addressing the real world examples, and we can just leave at that. I would still like for any rational person to explain to me how “absence of evidence is evidence of absence” since we have had an “absence” of evidence for thousands of things that exist and/or are true.

  22. #22 Peter Hurford (author) says:
    23 Mar 2012, 4:42 pm  

    Cl,

    I don’t have the time to reply in depth right now, but you might be interested in my comment to you about asteroids on the “God is Unproven” thread. You might be interested in Eliezer Yudkowsky’s two essays “Absence of Evidence is Evidence of Absence” and “You’re Entitled to Arguments But Not (That Particular) Proof”.

    If those don’t explain what we’re talking about well enough for you, please just let me know why you’re unconvinced and we can continue the discussion.

  23. #23 Tom Mitchell says:
    23 Mar 2012, 4:50 pm  

    @CL

    I would still like for any rational person to explain to me how “absence of evidence is evidence of absence” since we have had an “absence” of evidence for thousands of things that exist and/or are true.

    This is the first time I have heard of this statement “absence of evidence is evidence of absence,” but if you don’t mind I will explain it.

    The evidence of absence is not evidence of the absence of a specific phenomenon, but the absence of a meaningful method of investigation and the absence of a significant effect on the investigator.

    If you are looking for evidence of something that unknown, it is impossible to deny its existence because you do not understand the nature by which it exists. What can be said is that a lack of evidence decreases the value of further investigation.

    Let’s say I am looking for leprechauns. I have exhausted every method that seems reasonable and still found no leprechaun. At this point, I cannot say that there are no leprechauns. I could just be looking in the wrong place, in the wrong way. What can be said is that the existence of leprechauns is not relevant to my life. If it was relevant, then there would be evidence of some unknown, but relevant effect. For example, if I became absurdly unlucky or lucky in some pattern or quantifiable way. I would have somewhat of a real reason to look for leprechauns. However, the absence of evidence implies that there is no reason to assume some significant unknown factor in my life. If I had a reason to assume some significant unknown factor was affecting my life positively or negatively, then that would be evidence. By significant here, what I mean is something that is within my lotus of control. Our lives are constantly molded by factors well beyond our understanding or power. Why should we worry about such things? There is a TV Trope (I remember it best from Dexter’s Lab, but I am certain that it is in other shows as well) where suddenly the main character becomes able to sense germs for a brief amount of time. They realize that there are germs EVERYWHERE and freak out trying to isolate themselves from the germs. Eventually the character must come to terms with the fact that there are germs everywhere. Some might hurt them, but managing them all is beyond their control. Furthermore, ignoring them to a larger extent (while being cautious in specific situations) leaves them relatively safe.

    Leprechauns are the germs; there are theoretically inexhaustible methods of investigating the existence of leprechauns. Perhaps as I type there are dozens of little leprechauns affecting me. However, as far as I am currently able to tell they are not harming or benefiting me in a way that is within my potential to control; whereas on the other hand, undertaking an endless investigation would severely take the resources at my disposal (time, power, capital, etc). Is it worth it? No, it is not. There is an absence of evidence for the significant influence of leprechauns in my life, thus there is evidence of an absence of significant reason to devote my resources to looking for, controlling, or avoiding leprechauns.

  24. #24 cl says:
    23 Mar 2012, 11:01 pm  

    Charles R,

    If the math speaks for itself, then perhaps you can use math to address my examples?

  25. #25 cl says:
    23 Mar 2012, 11:50 pm  

    Tom Mitchell,

    I normally don’t take anyone who writes about leprechauns seriously, but, out of courtesy, I’ll reply:

    The evidence of absence is not evidence of the absence of a specific phenomenon,

    No offense but I think you’re misreading Yudkowsky and the others. Yudkowsky specifically mentions absence of a Fifth Column, not absence of a reliable means of investigation.

    What can be said is that a lack of evidence decreases the value of further investigation.

    Well, sure. You can say that, but it’s just your subjective opinion, not grounded in anything empirical. Why should rationality be subject to your opinions?

    What can be said is that the existence of leprechauns is not relevant to my life.

    I disagree. That you can’t find X does not entail that X is not relevant to your life. That’s a misstep. Again, I return to asteroids. It would have been silly, not to mention irrational, for the ancients to have concluded that “flying space rocks” weren’t relevant to their lives, simply because they couldn’t find any evidence of asteroids. As we all know, asteroids are most certainly relevant to our lives. After all, science—which most atheists exalt as the highest form of truth—says that we wouldn’t even be here were it not for asteroids. So I think your contention obviously lacks substance.

    If it was relevant, then there would be evidence of some unknown, but relevant effect.

    There may or may not be. You make an unjustified leap there. Further, as with “cathode rays” and asteroids, the effect may already be present. Our tools may be too rudimentary (as in the former), or the effects may be simply unrecognized (as with the latter). It’s not like the ancients didn’t have impact sites at their disposal.

    There is an absence of evidence for the significant influence of leprechauns in my life, thus there is evidence of an absence of significant reason to devote my resources to looking for, controlling, or avoiding leprechauns.

    Again, that’s your opinion. Run it with an all-powerful God who will judge us for our sins. Will you really say that the “absence of evidence” means such a God is not relevant to your life? If so, that strikes me as foolish. But hey, that’s just my opinion… :)

  26. #26 cl says:
    23 Mar 2012, 11:51 pm  

    Peter,

    Apparently you missed the comment where I explained to Charles R that I’d already read Yudkowsky’s “Absence of Evidence is Evidence of Absence.” It didn’t answer my questions. Neither did Charles R. As for Yudkowsky’s “You’re Entitled To…,” by the time I got through the slog (talk about verbosity!), not only do my questions remain unanswered, it actually seems to me that Yudkowsky condemns your line of reasoning, not my skepticism. He writes:

    You demand particular proof P; and if proof P is not available, then you’re allowed to disbelieve.

    And this is flatly wrong as probability theory.

    AFAICS, that’s exactly what you did in our debate, and in all your former evidential POE arguments. You demanded proof P (demonstration of a higher good for instances of suffering), and, when proof P was not or did not seem forthcoming, you acted as if you’re allowed to disbelieve a higher good exists. This is exactly why I called foul, and here is the Yud apparently backing me up on it.

    Going further, Yudkowsky writes,

    You do not get to screen off E1, E2, and E3 based on your ignorance of X!

    I agree! Again, that’s almost exactly what you did! For example, let E1 denote the fact, “many other instances of suffering have higher good.” Let E2 denote the fact, “we often don’t immediately recognize the higher good associated with any particular instance of suffering.” You simply screened off E1 and E2 based on nothing but your own ignorance / incredulity of X.

    Show me how it’s not so.

  27. #27 cl says:
    23 Mar 2012, 11:52 pm  

    Peter,

    As for the asteroids thing, I’d written:

    Say it’s 1,000 years ago. Would the failure of all the arguments for the existence of asteroids justify disbelief in their existence?

    …to which you replied,

    Yes, and again this is the difference between the epistemic situation (weak atheism) and the physical situation (strong atheism). Even if asteroids exist, it could be the case that there was no reason to believe in asteroids.

    Yet, here, in the OP, you write,

    Consider looking in a garage, and looking around. After about five minutes of looking, you realize that (1) you don’t see any bears and (2) you don’t see any microbes. Thus you conclude that there is (1) no bears in the garage and (2) no microbes in the garage. Clearly (1) is valid while (2) is not, and the inference to unjustified suffering is far more like (2) than like (1).

    You say disbelief in microbes is “not valid” (unjustified?), yet you say disbelief in asteroids is “justified,” and in both cases, for no other reason than this alleged, “absence of evidence.”

    So now I’m actually more confused than I was before.

  28. #28 Tom Mitchell says:
    24 Mar 2012, 10:14 am  

    I normally don’t take anyone who writes about leprechauns seriously, but, out of courtesy, I’ll reply:

    May I ask why you do not take anyone who writes about leprechauns seriously? I find this statement to be pretty shocking.

    No offense but I think you’re misreading Yudkowsky and the others. Yudkowsky specifically mentions absence of a Fifth Column, not absence of a reliable means of investigation.

    I guess I was not clear enough with my introduction. When I said, “this is the first time I have heard this statement, but If you do not mind I will explain it” what I meant was that I did not read Yudkowsky’s essay, nor any other essay. I just read the statement and tried to think of a way it could make sense to me. So no, I am not misreading it, I have not read it at all.

    What can be said is that a lack of evidence decreases the value of further investigation.

    Well, sure. You can say that, but it’s just your subjective opinion, not grounded in anything empirical. Why should rationality be subject to your opinions?

    This is not a subjective opinion; it is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. The number of ways a person can choose to spend there time is immense. As is the amount of resources a people can pour into a specific pursuit is equally immense. If you continue to pour your resources into an investment and it is providing you with no real yield, at some point you need to cut your losses, otherwise you are a fool. Explain to me how this is a subjective opinion?

    What can be said is that the existence of leprechauns is not relevant to my life.

    I disagree. That you can’t find X does not entail that X is not relevant to your life. That’s a misstep. Again, I return to asteroids. It would have been silly, not to mention irrational, for the ancients to have concluded that “flying space rocks” weren’t relevant to their lives, simply because they couldn’t find any evidence of asteroids. As we all know, asteroids are most certainly relevant to our lives. After all, science—which most atheists exalt as the highest form of truth—says that we wouldn’t even be here were it not for asteroids. So I think your contention obviously lacks substance.

    Ok, first, I am not an atheist. Second, asteroids are relevant to the shaping of earth, but how are they relevant to my life. How does investing my time, effort, and money into the study of asteroids make me a happier more successful person? You say “we all know asteroids are most certainly relevant to our lives.” No they are not. If they are that relevant why is the study of asteroids not a major part of the education curriculum? Why does it not have its own section on the SAT, ACT, or GRE. English, Math, Science, History, Music, these things are relevant to our lives. Knowledge about asteroids is specialized field of study that is not significant to the lives of most people. You talk about missteps and lacking substance… what do you call this baseless assumption?

    You say that it’s a misstep to say that if “you can’t find X does not entail that X is not relevant to your life.” But this is a gross misunderstanding of what I wrote. I acknowledge that there are plenty of unknown X’s that affect our lives. My point is pragmatic not religious. I am sure that our bodies are being affected by a myriad of unknown forces. Rather than dwelling on this and wasting resources trying to control something we don’t even understand how to look for, it is more productive to focus our energies on effects that we do have some understanding of. Should the thousands of effects we cannot imagine that are probably impacting our lives paralyze us and consume our time and effort? There is a name for people who pursue such a path, psychotic. If something is generally unseen, unfelt, unheard, even if affects my life, I have no way method of looking for it, let alone controlling it. I will not say it is a completely worthless pursuit, but to make it one’s primary pursuit is worthless. Have it as a hobby, a vacation, something you do on the weekend, fine. Invest a limited number of resources for the personal satisfaction it brings you, fine. But to devote your life to it, is stupid.

    Oh, and by the way Cl, you are being incredibly defensive because you think that my analogies of leprechauns and X are directed at christianity. Actually they are not. I am merely explaining the statement “absence of evidence, is evidence of absence” as I understand it. I think the statement is true, but it does not apply to religion or your Christianity. There is plenty of evidence for the benefit of religion, christianity included. Relax, religion is important, just not for many of the reasons you think it is. For example, you say

    Again, that’s your opinion. Run it with an all-powerful God who will judge us for our sins. Will you really say that the “absence of evidence” means such a God is not relevant to your life? If so, that strikes me as foolish. But hey, that’s just my opinion… :

    Run it with an all-mighty leprechaun who watches every time we drop pennies or disrespect currency in some way waiting to judge us in the afterlife. Does the “absence of evidence” mean that such a leprechaun is irrelevant to your life?

    I find it amusing that at the beginning you say ” I don’t normally take people who write about leprechauns seriously.” Do yo realize that for many people leprechauns and creationism are synonymous here? Why are leprechauns so unbelievable to you? I am sure I could find you a really old book about leprechauns. Would that make it better O_O?

  29. #29 cl says:
    24 Mar 2012, 2:16 pm  

    Tom Mitchell,

    Let’s aim for brevity.

    May I ask why you do not take anyone who writes about leprechauns seriously? I find this statement to be pretty shocking.

    False Argument #22: The Unicorns, Leprechauns, and Flying Spaghetti Monster Trope

    So no, I am not misreading it, I have not read it at all.

    My bad, I assumed you were following the discussion the same way we were. The pertinent, …and the others applies. You aren’t talking about the same thing as, say, Peter or Charles R.

    This is not a subjective opinion…

    Yes, it is. It’s your subjective opinion, and anyone else who shares it.

    …it is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. The number of ways a person can choose to spend there time is immense.

    Correct, and whether or not continued investigation has value remains a subjective opinion of the person doing the investigating (or the person making an outside judgment of “fool,” in this case, yourself). Those are subjective opinions. If you do not admit this, I won’t respond further, as there would be no value in doing so (my subjective opinion).

    Second, asteroids are relevant to the shaping of earth, but how are they relevant to my life.

    You would not have life without them (cf. K/T), and at any moment your life could end because of them. If that’s not “relevant” to your life, well… I guess we have different definitions of “relevant.”

    You talk about missteps and lacking substance… what do you call this baseless assumption?

    Obstinate misunderstanding on your behalf. I made no baseless assumption. Rather, I based my claim on facts (see above).

    I acknowledge that there are plenty of unknown X’s that affect our lives.

    Cool, then you’ve cleared that up.

    I will not say it is a completely worthless pursuit, but to make it one’s primary pursuit is worthless. Have it as a hobby, a vacation, something you do on the weekend, fine.

    These are your subjective opinions. True for you, not necessarily for everyone. Who are you to tell anyone else what to pursue as a “hobby” vs. “primary pursuit?” That’s for them to decide, not you.

    Relax, religion is important, just not for many of the reasons you think it is.

    I’m neither tense nor defensive such that your command to “relax” should have merit. Thanks for clearing up your opinion of religion. Which gods do you believe in? Or, by saying you aren’t an atheist, did you actually mean you’re an agnostic (i.e. weak atheist)?

    Do yo realize that for many people leprechauns and creationism are synonymous here?

    Yes. That’s precisely why I don’t normally take talk about leprechauns, unicorns, or flying spaghetti monsters seriously.

    Why are leprechauns so unbelievable to you?

    Why do you assume I find them unbelievable? I believe in demons. What people came to call “leprechauns” could very well have been some odd breed of demon.

  30. #30 Tom Mitchell says:
    24 Mar 2012, 3:58 pm  

    Those are subjective opinions. If you do not admit this, I won’t respond further, as there would be no value in doing so.

    The amount of resources a system has at its disposal, be it animal, plant, country, or machine, is not subjective. What destroys or benefits that structure is not subjective. Humans are unique systems in the license they have to self destruction. An individual’s assessment of the cost-benefit analysis can be misguided, but that does not change the fact that their exist objective boundaries between what is a productive use of resources and what is degenerate. Do you disagree?

  31. #31 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    24 Mar 2012, 6:41 pm  

    My just-posted entry in Dispute Issues can help explain why some debates can seem hopeless.

    “The unity of comprehension and belief and the common failure to grasp opposing arguments”

    http://tinyurl.com/7svouvj

  32. #32 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    24 Mar 2012, 10:12 pm  

    [T]hat does not change the fact that their exist objective boundaries between what is a productive use of resources and what is degenerate.

    Well, what determines those boundaries? Hume said it isn’t irrational to choose to come to ruin for the sake of eliminating an itch of one’s forefinger. [Hume said it much better.]

    Absence of evidence (speaking imprecisely) is evidence of absence. But you can’t justify that the utility of pursuing the low-probability course of action is insufficiently rewarding based on just that: you’ve said nothing about the other term when you determine expected utility: the potential utility. And the debate, after all, is about whether the proposition is true, not whether it’s worth pursuing. Leprechauns almost certainly don’t exist, but it’s not clear to me that you can fault someone as irrational for bending his efforts toward the low-probability objective of finding their pot of gold. But you certainly can if they claim earnestly that leprechauns exist.

    Actually, I don’t think your explanation goes far wrong. Introducing utility, like you did, can serve as an aid to getting the point when addressing the arithmetically challenged. It’s an intuition pump rather than an argument.

  33. #33 cl says:
    24 Mar 2012, 10:14 pm  

    Tom Mitchell,

    Do you disagree?

    No, with the exception that what “benefits” a human being is often subjective, as I’ve been saying (art doesn’t benefit everyone, nuts don’t benefit everyone, and study you deem “foolish” may benefit others; that is the point of contention here). Of course, none of that was in dispute. Anyhow, I see no value in trying to persuade you that value is subjective. You either get it or you don’t. So… unless you have something to add on the “absence of evidence” bit, I’m content to call it quits.

  34. #34 Tom Mitchell says:
    25 Mar 2012, 1:52 pm  

    Cl

    Thanks for clearing up your opinion of religion. Which gods do you believe in? Or, by saying you aren’t an atheist, did you actually mean you’re an agnostic (i.e. weak atheist)?

    I am a not agnostic. I am a New Confucian.

    No, with the exception that what “benefits” a human being is often subjective

    Humans are creatures that require need meaning to survive. The production of meaning is subjective, but the need for meaning is not. It is possible for people to produce meaning that is damaging to the human body/ the societal organism, and at times it is necessary. However, if these damages threaten the body of the person, or the body of the society they are not always worth it. Determining what damages are acceptable and what are not is incredibly complex, but I think it can be generally agreed that any meaning that threatens extinction or degrades the lives of the masses to slavery is unproductive. To commit myself fully to leprechauns is to abandon my other relations, living human relations, communal relations. Humans exist, thrive, and revel in relations. Any pursuit that removes the person from the context of their relations for marginal/unknown rewards is unproductive.

    Does that make sense? I apologize that I am not as neat as Peter with my writing. I prefer open discussion and often write in that regard, caring less about my format and more about fueling the sparks of conversation into a continuous flame.

  35. #35 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    25 Mar 2012, 2:16 pm  

    Charles R.,

    I think the math speaks for itself.

    The elementary algebra is certainly a decisive argument prima facie. By common sense, the duty then falls to the opponent to show the irrelevance of the formula; not to blithely ignore it and importune you to discuss putative empirical counterexamples. If you can’t impugn the algebraic logic, game over.

    If you just don’t get the algebra, elementary honesty requires that you admit the same. I suppose you might then, if you can, mount an argument that no formula could capture the principles governing the counterexamples.

    As to the counter-examples themselves, if they seem successful and the algebraic logic remains unimpugned–this implies that the counter-examples fail in some manner the opponent doesn’t understand. This, of course, is the case here, where the opponent’s argument proceeds from the blatant non sequitur that if there was evidence of falsity for asteroids, the asteroids, per hypothesis, must not have existed.

  36. #36 Charles R says:
    25 Mar 2012, 3:21 pm  

    the pre-Pasteur observer has no evidence of germs in her garage (or microbes or whatever), and a “Bayesian” would seem committed to the proposition that this “absence” is evidence of germicidal / microbial absence

    If there isn’t any evidence for germs, then you shouldn’t believe in them. Which part of this do you find confusing?

  37. #37 cl says:
    25 Mar 2012, 7:08 pm  

    Tom Mitchell,

    The production of meaning is subjective…

    Precisely my point. Therefore, what you deem “foolish” is not necessarily so for the next man, right?

    Stephen R. Diamond,

    In case this is in veiled reference to me:

    By common sense, the duty then falls to the opponent to show the irrelevance of the formula; not to blithely ignore it and importune you to discuss putative empirical counterexamples.

    You mistakenly assume I claim the formula irrelevant. I don’t. I’m simply asking for somebody to show me the math. Alternatively, I’m asking for someone to explain how “absence of evidence is evidence of absence” since we know—beyond any reasonable doubt—that innumerable propositions that once had “no evidence” are now established fact. For this reason, I assert that “absence of evidence is evidence of absence” is not an ideal metric for uncovering truth.

    This, of course, is the case here, where the opponent’s argument proceeds from the blatant non sequitur that if there was evidence of falsity for asteroids, the asteroids, per hypothesis, must not have existed.

    This is *NOT* the case here. I explained myself clearly, but you’ve already demonstrated that you’re out to attack, not understand (at least when I’m the interlocutor). It’s about warrant, justification, and effective epistemology. Of course, the whole world is pink through rose-colored glasses, so see what you want.

    Charles R,

    If there isn’t any evidence for germs, then you shouldn’t believe in them.

    Because you are projecting your own value statement / belief onto me. You are effectively telling me I “shouldn’t” believe in many, many things which are true, on account of a cute little maxim. As I explained above, it just doesn’t strike me as an effective metric for uncovering truth.

  38. #38 cl says:
    25 Mar 2012, 7:27 pm  

    Charles R,

    Here’s a bit of elaboration. Say it’s way back when, before asteroids were known to exist. You’re the skeptic, I’m the “flying space rock” enthusiast, and we’re standing in the middle of a huge crater debating my “crackpot” theory.

    “There’s no evidence,” you sneer, with noticeable ridicule and scorn in your voice. “Everyone knows there’s no such thing as flying space rocks. There’s absolutely zero evidence for this absurd claim. It’s stupid, you shouldn’t believe it, everyone knows rocks can’t fly, and according to my friend Tom Mitchell you shouldn’t devote ‘too much’ energy to investigating this idea.”

    “Not so fast,” I say. “Look around you. See the circular shape of this massive impression we’re standing in? This hole, my friend, is evidence of my theory! This big hole was made by a huge, flying space rock.”

    “Patently absurd!” you retort, much like Dawkins and the atheists of today in response to theistic claims. “You’re just seeing a pattern, inferring something when it doesn’t exist. Absence of evidence is evidence of absence. Duh. Everybody knows that. You shouldn’t believe in these space rocks.”

    Of course, we know how the story ends, and this is why I think “absence of evidence is evidence of absence” is not a very reliable metric for uncovering truth.

  39. #39 Tom Mitchell says:
    25 Mar 2012, 7:54 pm  

    Precisely my point. Therefore, what you deem “foolish” is not necessarily so for the next man, right?

    No, you are missing the point. Just because the human body has a need for water, does not make that need unconditional. If the water is too hot it is scalding; if it is too cold it is freezing, and if it is too much it is drowning. Just as the human body requires water it also requires meaning. That does not make all meaning the same. There is no need, no requirement that is unconditional. Some meaning is scalding; some meaning is freezing; and some meaning is without a doubt drowning.

    The production of meaning is subjective, which is to say that people have a potentially endless capacity to create meaning. But the types of meaning people create are not all equally harmless or beneficial.

  40. #40 cl says:
    25 Mar 2012, 8:14 pm  

    No, Tom, *YOU* still don’t get it. One last time: as long as a man takes care of his business, it is not foolish for him to search for X, unless he so deems it foolish for himself. Further, if a man wishes to forego his business because he deems the search for X that valuable, that is *HIS* business, not yours, and you’ve no right to call such a man “foolish.” Therefore, while “physical needs” are objective, value—what one man values over the next—is subjective. Hence, your claim that “searching for X despite absence of evidence is foolish,” is your subjective opinion, which is exactly what I said in the beginning.

    Admit it or not. I’m done with it.

  41. #41 Charles R says:
    25 Mar 2012, 8:30 pm  

    you are projecting your own value statement / belief onto me

    You’re right. I made an assumption. Let me rewrite it as a hypothetical imperative so the meaning of ‘should’ is clear.

    If there isn’t any evidence for germs, then you shouldn’t believe in them if you value having true beliefs

  42. #42 Tom Mitchell says:
    25 Mar 2012, 9:01 pm  

    @ CL
    It is self-evident to a Western ontology that views humans as discrete essences. The Confucian ontology defines humans as relationally created. The idea that a person could have intentions, motivations, and actions that existed separate from a kind of social ecosystem does not exists. You say

    As long as a man takes care of his business, it is not foolish for him to search for X, unless he so deems it foolish for himself. Further, if a man wishes to forego his business because he deems the search for X that valuable, that is *HIS* business…

    From my perspective the “HIS” you speak of is a son, a father, a friend, a worker, an enemy even. His business affects the business of those who define him, his parents, his children, his dear friends, and yes, even his country. Affect them drastically. It is every bit my business what meaning is being produced within my web, because I am defined by that web. It is for this reason your church finds it every bit their business what meaning is produced within their’s, and works to adamantly to limit the meaning found in homosexuality, evolution, divorce, abortion, etc. If a man’s business is truly his alone, than he should be able to pursue anything he finds valuable? Of course not.
    If a man deems mass murder or molestation valuable it is not *HIS* business. It impacts us all. We discourage meaning in suicide, sloth, wraith, and a multitude of other areas our historical tradition deems damaging to societal preservation. Are you not willing to admit this?
    It is at the impasse that we truly grow. I have no control over you, however I find your ultimatum of blindly accepting what you say or breaking off conversation appalling. If you were to ever show me that I am wrong I would admit it. I am able to do this. Are you?

  43. #43 Charles R says:
    25 Mar 2012, 9:31 pm  

    “Not so fast,” I say. “Look around you. See the circular shape of this massive impression we’re standing in? This hole, my friend, is evidence of my theory! This big hole was made by a huge, flying space rock.”

    I think you are confusing E with evidence. E is not evidence. E is an event. In your example, the observation of the hole counts as E.

    If the “space rock” enthusiast is right, P(H|E) > P(H). (And P(H|~E) < P(H).)

    And if the skeptic is right ("the hole is not evidence"), then P(H|E) = P(H|~E) = P(H). The posterior probability equals the prior probability. You don't need to update.

    Here is the main point: if you count the presence of E as evidence for the thing, then you aren’t allowed to also count its absence as for it.

    If the event E is “I prayed for my aunt and she got better” counts as evidence for the existence of a Prayer Answerer, and when you pray for her later she gets worse, then you aren’t allowed to come back with, “God works in mysterious ways.” Either E is evidence or it isn’t. But if it is, then you aren’t allowed to say ~E doesn’t count.

  44. #44 cl says:
    26 Mar 2012, 12:45 am  

    Charles R,

    That still doesn’t work for the reasons I stated. Sorry if I was unclear, but my implicit assumption was that our “flying space rock enthusiast” values true beliefs. The dilemma, again, is this: since we once had an absence of evidence for innumerable claims now known to be true, how is the maxim an accurate metric for truth-finding? In my example, the skeptic is setting the truth-seeker down the wrong path. The maxim leads the skeptic to a false conclusion.

    I think you are confusing E with evidence.

    I wasn’t, actually. Sorry if anything was unclear. I appreciate your efforts, but my question remains unanswered.

  45. #45 cl says:
    26 Mar 2012, 12:52 am  

    Tom Mitchell,

    Oh for crying out loud… fine, I’ll give it a few more go’s.

    …I find your ultimatum of blindly accepting what you say or breaking off conversation appalling.

    I didn’t ask you to blindly accept anything, and I don’t care what you find appalling. Again, that’s your subjective opinion. I’ve got mine, too. I find your willful denial appalling, but really, who cares? It’s an internet discussion going nowhere. No big deal.

    If you were to ever show me that I am wrong I would admit it. I am able to do this.

    Nonsense. I already did. You refuse to acknowledge an astonishingly simple truth: that you offer a subjective opinion when you say, “the person who values investigation despite an absence of evidence is foolish.” That’s what *YOU* think. That’s *YOUR* opinion. It is a *SUBJECTIVE* opinion. If *THEY* find value in searching, then it’s not foolish for them. Right?

  46. #46 Anonymous says:
    26 Mar 2012, 7:41 am  

    Cl

    Do you selectively read parts of what I write? Your responses evade the arguments I bring up in my posts. In fact they do not even acknowledge them. If I find value in rape should it be my business alone to act on it?

  47. #47 Charles R says:
    26 Mar 2012, 2:37 pm  

    The dilemma, again, is this: since we once had an absence of evidence for innumerable claims now known to be true, how is the maxim an accurate metric for truth-finding?

    I wasn’t trying to describe a method at truth finding. I was making a statement that says, given when we look at things, this is what we see, what should we believe?

    If you aren’t aware of any evidence the butler did it, then what reason would you have to arrest him? You need evidence. Something that points in the direction of the one who did the deed.

    Likewise, if you don’t have any evidence for germs (and you’ve done your due diligence, you’ve asked your friends, your doctor, Google and none of them have evidence for this thing called “germs”), then what reason could you give to the one who says, “So why do you believe in them?” You can’t give evidence because we already said you didn’t have any. What other reason could you give?

  48. #48 cl says:
    26 Mar 2012, 3:19 pm  

    Anonymous,

    Since there are no arguments from any “anonymous” in this thread, it would be impossible to evade arguments which have not been made. However, I suspect that you’re actually Tom Mitchell, and perhaps just forgot to type in your name or something. Am I selectively reading Tom Mitchell’s arguments? No. I read them in full, focus on what’s germane, and discard what is not.

    Either way, whoever you are, rape is not the issue here, nor has it ever been. That’s why I refuse to focus on it. It’s a red herring.

  49. #49 cl says:
    26 Mar 2012, 6:53 pm  

    Charles R,

    I think I see how we might make something productive out of this, finally. Give me a little time if you will. What I intend to write may actually become post-length, and if that’s the case, I’ll run it on my own blog and give a link here.

  50. #50 Tom Mitchell says:
    27 Mar 2012, 8:55 am  

    @ Cl

    Perhaps I am misunderstanding what we are talking about. I thought this was the course of our discussion
    1. You ask for any competent rational person to explain the statement “Absence of evidence is evidence of absence.”
    2. I thought it would be fun to try. My explanation was divorce of any other context, just a competent rational person playing with the semantics before me.
    3. My interpretation of the statement suggests that “meaning/values” are not completely subjective, but that a person’s value orientation translates into a paradigm of resource distribution, and that some paradigms of resource distribution are fundamentally destructive; thus some values/meaning can be called damaging.
    4. You counter that what a person values/finds meaning in, is completely subjective. Your exact words being

    as long as a man takes care of his business, it is not foolish for him to search for X, unless he so deems it foolish for himself. Further, if a man wishes to forego his business because he deems the search for X that valuable, that is *HIS* business, not yours, and you’ve no right to call such a man “foolish.”

    You start by saying as long as a man takes care of his business it is not foolish for him to search for X. I would agree with this statement, because “taking care of one’s business” can be interpreted to encompasses insuring the growth and prosperity of one’s social self (the people, places, ideas, and crafts that define personal identity). However, you go further to claim that If a man wishes to forego his business because he deems the search for X that valuable, that is *HIS* business… This incredibly individualistic statement is the point of contention. You logic resonates with what I would call the most destructive germ of enlightenment thinking. Namely, that a person first and foremost exists as an individual, separate of any social contract, and it is left to their autonomy alone to determine what is truly of worth. If the twists and turns of their imagination so lead them to abandon family, community, society, even their own growth and survival, then so be it. You imply that there exists no morals save the morality of autonomy. That regardless if a person chooses the right or wrong decision what is of worth is that they themselves do the choosing.

    5. It is in response to this claim that I bring up rape, molestation, murder, and any number of other atrocities. My examples are extreme, but so is your statement. They are not Red Herrings. You say that any value a person chooses is there business alone. If you argue that all meaning is completely subjective, then you are arguing that there should not be any limits placed on meaning; if there should not be any limits placed on meaning, than it is ok for a person to find meaning in rape, molestation, and murder.
    My second point is that your statement contradicts the practices of your religion, and I suspect yourself as well. To show this I must ask your position on abortion, homosexuality, and atheism. If you believe that people who value these things should be convinced otherwise, then you are contradicting your claim that a person is free to pursue any value as long as they themselves deem it valuable.

    7. Furthermore, If you believe that a person can go to hell for having certain values that in itself suggests that values are not subjective, but that they contain objective ramifications.

    Could you please show me where I am mistaken? And if you are going to claim something I say is a red herring, I am going to have to ask that you provide evidence of this charge.

  51. #51 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    27 Mar 2012, 3:28 pm  

    You say that any value a person chooses is their business alone.

    Then God, who insists on making it His business too, sure is a busybody

  52. #52 Tom Mitchell says:
    27 Mar 2012, 4:53 pm  

    @ Stephen R. Diamond

    Then God, who insists on making it His business too, sure is a busybody

    Is this directed at me? If so, this is pretty much my point, or at least a part of it.

  53. #53 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    27 Mar 2012, 5:20 pm  

    Please don’t mimick your interlocutor’s defensiveness, Tom Mitchell. Of course, it was an expression of agreement.

  54. #54 Anonymous says:
    27 Mar 2012, 5:53 pm  

    @ stephen

    Any defensiveness you read in my comment is all in your head buddy. I was just asking for a little clarification . I apologize if doing so offended you in some way. I was not mimicking anyone.

  55. #55 Peter Hurford (author) says:
    27 Mar 2012, 9:04 pm  

    The Initial Failure of my Argument

    @Stephen R. Diamond:

    How is this conclusion immune to your concession that God’s purposes may be beyond us? Maybe God isn’t so enchanted with scientific reason.

    You’re right, I misstated what I wanted to say. I’m shortly updating this essay with a much stronger version that I’ve recently come up with. I’ve also clarified some things to address some of Cl’s complaints.

  56. #56 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    27 Mar 2012, 9:18 pm  

    Any defensiveness you read in my comment is all in your head buddy. I was just asking for a little clarification . I apologize if doing so offended you in some way. I was not mimicking anyone.

    But surely you can’t deny your defensiveness in the above!

  57. #57 Tom Mitchell says:
    27 Mar 2012, 9:28 pm  

    @ Stephen

    But surely you can’t deny your defensiveness in the above!

    Haha nope, I would try, but I don’t like to lose. You got me there. My response was defensive.

  58. #58 Tom Mitchell says:
    28 Mar 2012, 6:00 pm  

    Man I was really looking forward to Cl showing me how I am wrong. I hope he does not just give up.

  59. #59 cl says:
    28 Mar 2012, 9:03 pm  

    Tom Mitchell,

    I gave up days ago. I suspect your admitted aversion to being wrong is outweighing your search for truth. If some person wants to make an investigation their life’s focus, that is their business. Your claim that such is foolish is your subjective opinion. Desire X is only foolish for person Y if pursuit of desire X precludes the attainment of higher (ultimate) desires. That’s how you’re wrong: you mistake a subjective opinion for an objective statement. Nothing’s changed.

  60. #60 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    28 Mar 2012, 9:23 pm  

    I suspect your admitted aversion to being wrong is outweighing your search for truth. If some person wants to make an investigation their life’s focus, that is their business. Your claim that such is foolish is your subjective opinion. Desire X is only foolish for person Y if pursuit of desire X precludes the attainment of higher (ultimate) desires.

    Your conclusion agrees with mine until you get to the ad hoc “higher (ultimate) desires,” but you radically underrate the hardness of the problem regarding whether desires can be irrational per se. Consider that ordinary pleasure utilitarians (my kind of utilitarianism, were I compelled to become a utilitarian) hold that there is a unique rational act for a person at a given time. Then you escalate the oversimplification by effectively accusing Tom Mitchell of intellectual dishonesty. He’s presented not the slightest reason to think he’s averse to admitting he’s wrong; in fact, something to the contrary in the candor of his penultimate comment. Innuendo that you “won” the exchange is boorish (at the least). Particularly so when the conclusion is so unwarranted.

  61. #61 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    28 Mar 2012, 10:24 pm  

    Peter,

    The basic problem is that our lack of knowledge about God’s higher goods cuts both ways, and thus digs deep into theism as well.

    But I don’t see that the skeptical theist must deny knowledge about God’s higher goods. Rather, they must deny only their ability to understand the relationship between what God permits and his ends. As I wrote previously, God may have other means of communicating his nature besides the universe he allows. That many events are unfathomable doesn’t mean they all are.

    In other words, the skeptical theist refuses to judge God, pleading incapacity. That doesn’t mean the skeptical theist refuses to believe God. He maintains that we have better means to discern God’s higher purposes: revelation. (What we lack, to repeat, is the ability to connect these purposes with many real-world outcomes.)

  62. #62 Tom Mitchell says:
    28 Mar 2012, 11:40 pm  

    CL,

    Desire X is only foolish for person Y if pursuit of desire X precludes the attainment of higher (ultimate) desires. That’s how you’re wrong: you mistake a subjective opinion for an objective statement. Nothing’s changed.

    Actually apparently A LOT has changed, because that little conditional statement ” Desire X is only foolish for person Y if pursuit of desire X precludes the attainment of higher (ultimate) desires.” is not your point, or at least not the one you have been advocating up until now. In fact, it is an over-christianized version of MY point. i have been arguing that not all meaning (which you have now replaced as “desires”) are subjective. That some meaning (desires in your new terminology) carry objectively negative consequences, and that because of this it is possible to tell a person that they have detrimental meaning (desires).

    If you are able to tell a person that their desire is foolish if it impedes some “ultimate desire” that is pretty much saying that all desires (meaning) are not subjective opinion.

    That last paragraph you wrote contradicts itself, and it contradicts what you have said up until now.

    Can someone else verify that CL is contradicting himself, so that maybe he can finally understand that. Furthermore the really germane critiques I have of your position that meaning is completely subjective are completely avoided in your responses. Like a parrot you repeat the same blind statement that “I am mistaking a subjective opinion for an objective” all the while refusing to enter into a real discussion about this statement, and even contradicting it as you continue to criticize me.

    Honestly I am at a loss as to how you can be so clueless. I am not trying to be mean, I just cannot understand how you can so blatantly contradict yourself and not see it. I feel like you either do see your fault, and it is pride that is creating this facade, or that any pretense of logicality is the facade.

    I mean please, Peter, somebody, am I wrong in saying he switched what he is saying, or that what he is saying contradicts itself and the practices of the christian church, hell and the practices of good christians?

  63. #63 cl says:
    28 Mar 2012, 11:41 pm  

    Stephen R. Diamond,

    I respect that you’re trying to engage rationally instead of your usual mud-flinging and hot-tempered vitriol, but the fact remains: you’ve been a venomous, mean-spirited accuser guilty of the very dishonesty you accuse me of. The fact that you make sporadic but salient contributions is, well… tangential at best. Not that I expect honesty from you, but you owe me apologies and concessions, and I won’t engage you here or elsewhere until you accept your rational duties. Sorry.

  64. #64 cl says:
    29 Mar 2012, 12:23 am  

    Tom Mitchell,

    Can someone else verify that CL is contradicting himself,

    A contradiction is a conjunction of X and ~X. I’ve not contradicted myself and I challenge you to prove otherwise. Of course, if you’re looking for someone else to join a crusade, I suggest Stephen R. Diamond. He’s usually more than happy to accuse me.

    That last paragraph you wrote contradicts itself, and it contradicts what you have said up until now.

    No, it doesn’t. As far as you and I are concerned, I’ve advanced one position. You already know what it is, but I’ll repeat it:

    What can be said is that a lack of evidence decreases the value of further investigation. (Tom Mitchell)

    Well, sure. You can say that, but it’s just your subjective opinion, not grounded in anything empirical. (cl)

    That’s it. This whole argument is about that. You allege that I refuse to advance the discussion, but, honestly, there’s no discussion to advance. What am I supposed to do? Simply assent to your stubbornness? If you don’t understand that value requires a valuer, and that not all people share the same values, I don’t know what else to say. Sure, lack of evidence might decrease the value of further investigation *TO YOU,* but that does not mean it necessarily decreases the value of further investigation for the next person. Tenacity preceded many a scientific paradigm shift and if somebody wants to continue despite a grim forecast that’s their prerogative.

  65. #65 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    29 Mar 2012, 12:31 am  

    Peter,

    Me: “He maintains that we have better means to discern God’s higher purposes: revelation.”

    The implication that revelation is the skeptical theist’s only method for discerning God’s purposes is too strong. If the skeptical theist’s methods could be so limited, that would be a discrediting limitation, if not completely discrediting. Perhaps I should be as concrete as I can. The skeptical theist is likely to build his case within the constraints of a deontological ethics. God is good means not just that he avoids unnecessary suffering but that he is honest, just, and has the usual virtues. (He’s perfect, after all.) So, when Christ comes and says X, it’s to be believed, particularly where Christ demonstrates all the expected virtues himself.

    So, the skeptical theist can consistently deny that we are capable of comprehending God’s plan so as to explain suffering and that we have an empirical basis for believing that God is benevolent when He tells us so, in the person of Jesus. God made be inscrutable under a utilitarian calculus, yet be accountable under a conventional deontology, forbidding lies. We can’t tell whether God maximizes happiness or minimizes suffering, but we could know if he lied when he purports to speak in ordinary language.

    So, Christ manifested a character that proved his divinity because only a divine personage could possibly have had so excellent a character. His ability to perform miracles also entered the mix. This excellent character included the virtue of complete honesty, so God can be believed when he tells us of his own benevolence.

    My point is that there are stories the skeptical theist can tell to explain how he knows God is benevolent, besides observing the outcomes of God’s putative benevolence. It isn’t the case, as you contend, that the consistent skeptical theist must deny all knowledge of God’s higher goods.

    Although I haven’t thought it through, it is possible that your argument serves to exclude a God whose for which our knowledge of His benevolence is defined through a thoroughgoing and exclusive utilitarianism.

  66. #66 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    29 Mar 2012, 12:50 am  

    Honestly I am at a loss as to how you can be so clueless. I am not trying to be mean, I just cannot understand how you can so blatantly contradict yourself and not see it. I feel like you either do see your fault, and it is pride that is creating this facade, or that any pretense of logicality is the facade.

    The second.

  67. #67 Tom Mitchell says:
    29 Mar 2012, 10:13 am  

    CL

    A contradiction is a conjunction of X and ~X. I’ve not contradicted myself and I challenge you to prove otherwise.

    Sure I would be glad to.

    Your claim:

    …*HIS* business, not yours, and you’ve no right to call such a man “foolish.” .

    What a person values is their business and their business alone, not for anyone else to judge.

    Your NEW claim:

    Desire X is only foolish for person Y if pursuit of desire X precludes the attainment of higher (ultimate) desires. .

    If you provide a conditional where a person’s desires can be foolish, then you are saying that SOMEthings the valuer values can be judged by a third party as wrong/detrimental; meaning that they are not completely subjective. There is an inconsistency between these two statements (you have no right to call such a man foolish; you CAN call such a man foolish, but only if X); an inconsistency between statements is a contradiction. Now you can spout all the lies you want about my aversion to wrongness, but it is you who is evading the holes I point out in your logic.

  68. #68 Tom Mitchell says:
    29 Mar 2012, 10:27 am  

    @ CL Disproving your claim

    I decided to break this up into two posts. You asked me to show you how you contradict yourself; I did in the last post.

    Now I will prove to you that your claim, what a person values is their business and their business alone, not for anyone else to judge, is false.

    I have two claims to critique this position:

    1.) What a person values is NOT their business and their business alone, because values lead to actions, and the actions of an individual have communal effects. The idea of the “individual” whose interest and business is isolated from a relational web is a cultural assumption divorced from the reality of the human condition.

    2.) The production of value is subjective to the valuer, BUT the adoption of a given set of values is not. Values lead to actions; actions lead to habits; habits lead to either the growth, decay, or destruction of an organism.

    To simplify it further in true Peter Hurford style:

    P1: Values lead to actions
    P2: Actions have objective impact on the survival and happiness of an organism.
    P3: The actions of an individual have ecological ramifications (they affect the people, places, and things within its environment)

    Why my claims are relevant to Cl’s claim

    1.) If a person’s existence is fundamentally relational, then their values lead to actions that impact the people, places, and things that are networked into their field of influence; having real costs and benefits to others. Making “their business” other people’s business as well.

    2.) If values lead to actions, then the adoption of values has objective ramifications for the valuer. The actions an organism experiences shape its survival. Different values lead to different actions. Different actions have different effects on the actor. Actions of a certain magnitude can be objectively labeled as either beneficial or destructive. Therefore the ability of an individual/community to survive and the quality of that survival can be used to measure the value of their beliefs to some extent.

    Proof of Claim 1 (C1) and claim 2 (C2) means that:
    -Your assumptions of extreme individualism are false.
    - Your assumptions of extreme subjectivity are false.

    Meaning, you are wrong. Now the question is do I need to provide evidence for C1 and C2? I could see perhaps you would require further support to believe C2, but C1 should really be self-evident. Do you not concede that no person exists as divorced from their environment as your claim (what a person values is their business and their business alone, not for anyone else to judge, is false) suggests?

  69. #69 cl says:
    14 Apr 2012, 2:40 pm  

    Tom Mitchell,

    There is an inconsistency between these two statements (you have no right to call such a man foolish; you CAN call such a man foolish, but only if X); an inconsistency between statements is a contradiction. Now you can spout all the lies you want about my aversion to wrongness, but it is you who is evading the holes I point out in your logic.

    Why didn’t you start at the beginning? Just looking to prove a point, perhaps? Back it up:

    What can be said is that a lack of evidence decreases the value of further investigation. (Tom Mitchell)

    Well, sure. You can say that, but it’s just your subjective opinion, not grounded in anything empirical. (cl)

    THAT is what we’re talking about here. You didn’t show a contradiction. I said that *YOU* saying “a lack of evidence decreases the value of further investigation” is subjective. That is not mutually exclusive with my statement that, “Desire X is only foolish for person Y if pursuit of desire X precludes the attainment of higher (ultimate) desires.”

    Now, let’s say we were talking about an actual person, call him Jake. Let’s say Jake told us that the primary focus of his life is providing for his family via his work as a taxman. THEN, and only then, could your claim move from “subjective” to “objective” status. But we were never talking about a person whose desires we knew, were we? You just tossed out a broad claim without grounding it to anything or anybody in the real world. Therefore, it remains your subjective opinion.

    Now the question is do I need to provide evidence for C1 and C2?

    No. You simply need to realize that your whole progression is irrelevant to the original issue that sparked our discussion. Whether lack of evidence decreases the value of further investigation is a subjective matter for each investigator to decide.

  70. #70 Paul Wright says:
    16 May 2012, 9:26 am  

    While that settles theodices for now, it’s also really important to note that some suffering can be justified even if it is entirely avoidable by humans, for God might have had to allow for the possibility of suffering, such as allowing us to freely choose choices that harm us, or allow the existence of criminals to give us something meaningful to try and stop. While I don’t think these theodices succeed at the end of the day, it indicates that it is not true that if God exists, removing any instance of suffering must make the everyone net worse off.

    Can you say a bit more about this? What I mean is that it looks like a theodicy in which the possibility of choosing is the higher good. But in that case, if you remove that possibility and reduce suffering, you have in fact made everyone worse off, because you’ve curtailed their free will.

  71. #71 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    16 May 2012, 5:59 pm  

    it looks like a theodicy in which the possibility of choosing is the higher good. But in that case, if you remove that possibility and reduce suffering, you have in fact made everyone worse off, because you’ve curtailed their free will.

    I don’t think this is Peter’s response, but I’d respond to this argument by maintaining that countercausal free will free will either doesn’t solve the problem or it isn’t an intelligible concept. If free will is compatibility with “determinism,” then God could arrange things so we choose right. if, as I maintain, free will denies “determinism,” then it’s incoherent (and one can “justify” anything by invoking it).

  72. #72 Paul Wright says:
    19 May 2012, 1:01 pm  

    Sorry, I wasn’t very clear there. What I meant to question was the statement that “it is not true that if God exists, removing any instance of suffering must make the everyone net worse off.” I don’t see how Peter got there from the examples he gave, since they seem to be cases where removing the suffering would in fact have made everyone worse off by removing some goods which otherwise more than compensated for the suffering.

  73. #73 Stephen R. Diamond says:
    19 May 2012, 5:14 pm  

    I think that’s a good catch, Paul. To be consistent, Peter must have intendet to say

    it is not true that if God exists, removing any instance of suffering must make the [sic] everyone net better off.

    This is a for Peter unusual confusing sentence. Three negative concepts: not true, remove, worse; I think Peter confused himself. :)

Leave a Reply

You must be logged in to post a comment.