Follow up to: Why Not to Take Pascal’s Wager, The Great Problem of Evil, Part III, and the Christian CADRE’s “So You Don’t Like Global Warming”

I’m trying something new in this essay: I’m broadening my “Responses” section to include addressing the specific essays and comments of other people, even if they aren’t addressed to me. If I see something interesting and thought provoking enough that I feel compelled to comment on it, I will. Today, I do.

Earlier this month, an author named “Metacrock” posted an article on the Christian CADRE, a website devoted to improving and spreading Christian apologetics (defenses of the truth and validity Christian religion). CADRE stands for Christian Colligation of Apologetics Debate Research and Evangelism, which admittedly does make calling it a “Christian CADRE” rather redundant.

Usually Christian arguments I encounter aren’t all that impressive or insightful, but I was recently drawn to the argument made in an article called “So BK you don’t like Global Warming, how do you feel about eternal warming?”. The argument is very impressive and original and thus worth commenting on, but as I will attempt to show, not compelling and actually rather error-prone. (Note: I will refer to the author of this argument as the CADRE.)

In this article, the CADRE makes the following point:

The thing to do with Global warming is not to argue against it. Use it. Atheists are almost bound to believe in it (I believe in it–not the point). Rather than argue against it as an example of bad lock, it’s more useful as an example of good logic. This is so because the logic of Global warming is the same logic used in Pascals wager.

I highly recommend you read the actual article, but here is my attempt at summarizing the argument made by the CADRE:

1. While some state of affairs may be unlikely to occur, they can still be worth worrying about if the impact of that state of affairs is high enough.
2. Global warming is one of these examples. We don’t really know if Global Warming is likely, but if it does happen, it could kill us all, so we should worry about it and attempt to prevent that.
3. Pascal’s Wager is also one of these examples. We don’t really know if God exists, but the benefit from worshipping him (Heaven) is so great and the benefit of not worshipping him is so bad (Hell) that we should err on the side of God.
4. There is no logical difference between the argument for Global Warming and the argument for Pascal’s Wager, so if you accept one you should accept the other.
5. Therefore all atheists who accept global warming should also accept Pascal’s wager.

It’s important to note that this argument is not meant to prove the existence of God or the truth of the specific Christian God, but to highlight an inconsistency in atheist/naturalist thinking, assuming the atheist/naturalist accepts global warming and doesn’t accept Pascal’s Wager (which is not a bad assumption to make).

An Outline of Disagreement

In highlighting this debate, I will make the same clarification that the CADRE made: the truth of global warming is not at issue here. While I personally do believe in the existence of man-made global warming, I readily concede I am not a climate scientist and I am not familiar with all the cross-fire arguments on this issue.

Instead, I defer to the large preponderance of climate scientists who do support man-made global warming as the best explanation for the facts as we currently have them, at least until I have a very good reason to overthrow modern science.

That being said, I do know that knowledge of global warming is far more definite than knowledge of God. Global warming is a testable phenomenon. and we can use empirical methods to find out what increases or decreases carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, even if our current knowledge is incomplete or inaccurate. We cannot use the same methods to detect God, as far as I know.

So that will be the basis of my first criticism: The Argument for Global Warming is not the same as Pascal’s Wager because the existence of Global Warming is generally not based upon a wager.

Additionally, even if my first argument were to fail and Global Warming was seen as fundamentally wager-ish, it is still not analagous to Pascal’s Wager because it is a straight expected utility equation, unencumbered by the individual problems with Pascal’s Wager.

Pascal’s Wager can never be the result of the chance of God multiplied by the benefit of believing in God simply because we must deal with the issues I brought up in “Why Not to Take Pascal’s Wager”.

That will be my second criticism: The Argument for Global Warming is not the same as Pascal’s Wager because the Global Warming can be construed as a straight expected utility calculation, whereas Pascal’s Wager cannot.

Is Global Warming a Wager?

Now to articulate and defend my first criticism: that the logic of Global Warming is not based on a wager. But how does the CADRE make the case that it is a wager in the first place? They say:

The reason [...] global warming and the wager use the same logic is because they are examples of what we in college debate used to call “risk taker analysis.” [...]

The [Pascal's] wager says “there is everything to gain and nothing to lose by following Christ and placing belief in God. But there is everything to lose and nothing to gain by not following Christ.” So if that is true the risk taking analysis shows that the much greater risk is in not being a Christian, or whatever. That’s breaks the tie between the realization of reality and the doubt fostered by nothing overwhelming direct proof. We can’t totally prove it either way, but the greater risk is in not believing. The only thing to be gained by not believing is momentary sinful pleasure which in the long run always runs out and works against the experiencer.

Global warming [is also] risk taking analysis. Like the God question we don’t have total proof either way. We can be sure that man made source so green house gas are the real cause or even the major catalyst, although there’s a good probability that they are. So what is the loss vs gain ratio? does it justify the risk? The risk in believing in global warming is that we will spend a lot of money trying to switch over to non green house producing sources. That will cost profits and might result in economic problems. The worst outcome would be loss of jobs. What is the risk in not assuming it?

So when it comes to global warming, the CADRE is right that we don’t have total, undoubtable proof that Global Warming exists because we can always be wrong about science, especially when it addresses very complex questions like climate interactions. This means we move to an expected utility approach, what the CADRE calls a “risk taker analysis”, where we do this:

U = (Estimate of chance of global warming being disastrous) * (Cost to us of global warming being disastrous – Cost to us of preventing global warming) – (Estimate of chance of global warming not being disastrous) * (Cost to us of preventing global warming)

If U is positive, we gain more overall by preventing global warming. Now here we don’t have to worry about the values of these numbers or even if U is positive, we just have to compare it to the analogy for God:

G = (Estimate of change of God existing) * (Benefit of believing in God – Cost of believing in God) – (Estimate of God not existing) * (Cost of believing in God)

The problem with Pascal’s Wager is that the first term “Estimate of change of God existing” is undefined and completely unknown according to Pascal, but the argument only works because “Benefit of believing in God” is presumed to be infinity and “Cost of believing in God” is presumed to be 0 or even negative infinity, thus making G infinite.

But the calculation for global warming is not based on an unknown probability followed by an infinite cost, but rigorous attempts at finding precise, definite values for all the terms. This makes the argument for supporting global warming prevention efforts to definitely be an expected utility approach, but definitely not a Pascal’s wager because it doesn’t deal with a completely unknown probability followed by an estimation of infinite benefit.

Therefore the two are not analogous, and it still can be completely justified to believe in global warming prevention efforts but still deny that Pascal’s Wager makes sense.

Does Pascal’s Wager Work?

But there is another huge problem with Pascal’s Wager that completely distinguishes it from Global Warming: mainly that the G we just outlined a formula for is completely inaccurate. I write about this in my essay “Why Not to Take Pascal’s Wager”, specifically the following sub-problems:

Certainty of the Benefits?

We are rather certain of the benefit of preventing global warming, but we do not know the benefit of worshipping God. Does God truly send all believers to heaven, or only the sincere believers? And which religion does he patron? What if God sends only atheists to Heaven? What if universalism is true? All these make the expected utility calculation for God extensively muddled, whereas global warming does not face these problems.

Is the Benefit Necessary?

Believing in God may not be necessary to gain the benefit of worshipping him, whereas believing in Global Warming is necessary to gain the benefit of preventing it. If God allows good people to go to Heaven regardless of their religion, Pascal’s Wager is dead. And it’s safe to assume that any just God would judge people’s character and moral fiber; not engage in unconstitutional religious discrimination. This counter-logic cannot be used against Global Warming.

Reducto Ad Absurdums?

Pascal’s Wager faces a reducto ad absurdum for it’s logic, whereas sound expected utility calculations like global warming do not. For instance, what if God is a trickster evil god that punishes everyone who eats jellybeans? The chances of this are unknown, but the benefit of avoiding jellybeans just in case is infinite. Is it now logical to avoid jellybeans? Again, this counter-logic cannot be used against Global Warming.

This provides even more defense that Global Warming and Pascal’s Wager are not analogous, and that we are justified in supporting global warming prevention efforts while denying that Pascal’s Wager makes sense.

With God, Does Global Warming Even Matter?

So I think I have successfully dealt with the CADRE’s argument — Global Warming is not at all similar to Pascal’s Wager when we really look at it. But there still is another point to make, in the spirit of my essay “The Great Problem of Evil”:

If God is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing, then he has the power to prevent Global Warming and will prevent anything that causes needless suffering. Therefore global warming is part of the all-good plan in a way we can’t understand, just like cancer, and Christians have no reason to prevent it.

Christianity in general suffers from the Problem of Evil, which I outline in length in my essay “The Great Problem of Evil” and continue to defend. But this argument isn’t about forcing the Problem of Evil, but to show that global-warming-fearing Christians are inconsistent in applying their defense.

Why does God allow, say, babies to die from birth defects? A variety of reasons have been given: God is testing our faith, it is necessary to build souls, it’s a consequence of free will, or — my favourite — God has some unknown but conveniently morally sufficient purpose.

For the Problem of Evil to be false, this means that every instance of suffering must be necessary; in other words, required for a higher good. If you believe that God is all-good and the Problem of Evil fails, there’s no reason why Global Warming should be singled out: it too must also be necessary suffering aimed at a higher good.

This means any attempt to prevent Global Warming is an attempt to prevent the higher good Global Warming aims for. Therefore, on this logic, Christians have no reason to acknowledge Global Warming as an issue that will cause needless suffering. Doing so is a de-facto acceptance of the Problem of Evil.

As a bonus, I’ve summarized this in a logical argument:

1. A belief in disastrous outcomes of Global Warming requires a belief that God would allow needless suffering.
2. A belief in Christianity requires a belief that God would never allow needless suffering.
3. Therefore from 1 and 2, a belief in disastrous outcomes of Global Warming and a belief in Christianity are contradictory.

Conclusion

When all is said and done in this essay, I definitely do think Global Warming is a problem worth preventing. Not only am I convinced by the consensus of the scientists on the issue, but am convinced by the expected utility approach employed by the CADRE that would hold even if there were much less scientific consensus.

I also think the CADRE’s argument works well in reverse: anyone who believes in Pascal’s Wager should also accept the general logic behind Global Warming, though I think the Problem of Evil ultimately forces them to abandon the belief that Global Warming does need to be prevented.

But the CADRE does not establish that I need to accept Pascal’s Wager just because I already accept Global Warming: instead, I can denounce Pascal’s Wager as completely baseless, as I already do.

Additionally, I think the CADRE cannot endorse Global Warming prevention if they want to be consistent with the Problem-of-Evil-defeating idea that needless suffering does not exist.

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