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	<title>Comments on: Clarifying The Idea of Meaning</title>
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	<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning</link>
	<description>A blog celebrating the great play of drawing conclusions and integrating a wide variety of fields.</description>
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		<title>By: Peter Hurford</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6681</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Hurford</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Oct 2011 14:54:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6681</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;I&gt;The BIV is supposed to be stated as, “How can you know we’re not BIVs?” Then the idea is to see if it’s possible to logically construct the BIV such that you cannot possibly tell…and indeed it’s possible as far as we know. For completeness: if you cannot tell, it means the virtual world is indistinguishable from a real world for all intents and purposes.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Yes, agreeing with you and summarizing my points:

1.) It is impossible to prove or disprove the ontological implication of BIV Theory.
2.) This means that, in a sense, &quot;you cannot disprove that you are a BIV&quot;.
3.) But, BIV Theory and No-BIV Theory suggest worlds that are identical in every detectable way
4.) Therefore BIV Theory is not actually truth-apt
5.) Therefore, there is no reason to care about BIV, because it cannot have any implications for your life

~

&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;i&gt;Same for p-zombies as far as i can tell.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;

I don&#039;t buy the p-zombie argument at all for all the truth-apt reasons I mentioned here.

Eliezer Yudkowsky has &lt;a href=&quot;http://lesswrong.com/lw/pn/zombies_the_movie/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;a very humorous take on the issue here&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;http://lesswrong.com/lw/p7/zombies_zombies/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;explains his opposition to p-zombies here&lt;/a&gt;.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><i>The BIV is supposed to be stated as, “How can you know we’re not BIVs?” Then the idea is to see if it’s possible to logically construct the BIV such that you cannot possibly tell…and indeed it’s possible as far as we know. For completeness: if you cannot tell, it means the virtual world is indistinguishable from a real world for all intents and purposes.</i></p></blockquote>
<p>Yes, agreeing with you and summarizing my points:</p>
<p>1.) It is impossible to prove or disprove the ontological implication of BIV Theory.<br />
2.) This means that, in a sense, &#8220;you cannot disprove that you are a BIV&#8221;.<br />
3.) But, BIV Theory and No-BIV Theory suggest worlds that are identical in every detectable way<br />
4.) Therefore BIV Theory is not actually truth-apt<br />
5.) Therefore, there is no reason to care about BIV, because it cannot have any implications for your life</p>
<p>~</p>
<blockquote><p><i>Same for p-zombies as far as i can tell.</i></p></blockquote>
<p>I don&#8217;t buy the p-zombie argument at all for all the truth-apt reasons I mentioned here.</p>
<p>Eliezer Yudkowsky has <a href="http://lesswrong.com/lw/pn/zombies_the_movie/" rel="nofollow">a very humorous take on the issue here</a>, and <a href="http://lesswrong.com/lw/p7/zombies_zombies/" rel="nofollow">explains his opposition to p-zombies here</a>.</p>
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		<title>By: joseph</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6679</link>
		<dc:creator>joseph</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Oct 2011 11:43:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6679</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;Plus, we basically are BIVs. Just, the vat is usually called a ‘skull,’ and the world being fed to us is the actual world.&quot;

Perhaps it is the nugget of truth that protects this viewpoint from being falsified.

As with solipsism, the world, as I know it, really is a mental construct, as that is the human nervous system&#039;s way of representing a world.

Same for p-zombies as far as i can tell.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Plus, we basically are BIVs. Just, the vat is usually called a ‘skull,’ and the world being fed to us is the actual world.&#8221;</p>
<p>Perhaps it is the nugget of truth that protects this viewpoint from being falsified.</p>
<p>As with solipsism, the world, as I know it, really is a mental construct, as that is the human nervous system&#8217;s way of representing a world.</p>
<p>Same for p-zombies as far as i can tell.</p>
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		<title>By: Alrenous</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6677</link>
		<dc:creator>Alrenous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Oct 2011 00:53:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6677</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The BIV is supposed to be stated as, &quot;How can you know we&#039;re not BIVs?&quot; Then the idea is to see if it&#039;s possible to logically construct the BIV such that you cannot possibly tell...and indeed it&#039;s possible as far as we know. For completeness: if you cannot tell, it means the virtual world is indistinguishable from a real world for all intents and purposes. 

Plus, we basically are BIVs. Just, the vat is usually called a &#039;skull,&#039; and the world being fed to us is the actual world.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The BIV is supposed to be stated as, &#8220;How can you know we&#8217;re not BIVs?&#8221; Then the idea is to see if it&#8217;s possible to logically construct the BIV such that you cannot possibly tell&#8230;and indeed it&#8217;s possible as far as we know. For completeness: if you cannot tell, it means the virtual world is indistinguishable from a real world for all intents and purposes. </p>
<p>Plus, we basically are BIVs. Just, the vat is usually called a &#8216;skull,&#8217; and the world being fed to us is the actual world.</p>
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		<title>By: Peter Hurford</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6676</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Hurford</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 20:55:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6676</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[@Alrenous:

&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;i&gt;Whether people in fact normally use ideas for prediction or not is an empirical question; it cannot be solved deductively. If they don’t, it implies they’re not using reason, that’s all.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Definitely.  And I don&#039;t claim that all people do use ideas for predictions, nor would I know how to go about testing that.

The claims I make are: (1) the only statements that make sense to discuss are statements that are truth-apt and (2) the only beliefs we should hold are about statements that are truth-apt.

~

&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;i&gt;You’re suffering from the materialist auto-dismissal of emotions and consciousness. The difference between a matrix/brain-in-vat world and the real world is not physically truth-apt. However, believing you’re not a BIV is more satisfying.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;

I do agree that it is more satisfying for some people, but I think this is because an error in reasoning is going on, and if we correct this error, the satisfaction goes away.

This is because satisfaction is rooted in knowing you are in a preferable state of affairs, and if two states are identical in every testable way, it makes no sense to say the non-BIV state of affairs is preferable.

I write about this in &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.greatplay.net/essays/the-end-of-cartesian-demons&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;&quot;The End of Cartesian Demons&quot;&lt;/a&gt;.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Alrenous:</p>
<blockquote><p><i>Whether people in fact normally use ideas for prediction or not is an empirical question; it cannot be solved deductively. If they don’t, it implies they’re not using reason, that’s all.</i></p></blockquote>
<p>Definitely.  And I don&#8217;t claim that all people do use ideas for predictions, nor would I know how to go about testing that.</p>
<p>The claims I make are: (1) the only statements that make sense to discuss are statements that are truth-apt and (2) the only beliefs we should hold are about statements that are truth-apt.</p>
<p>~</p>
<blockquote><p><i>You’re suffering from the materialist auto-dismissal of emotions and consciousness. The difference between a matrix/brain-in-vat world and the real world is not physically truth-apt. However, believing you’re not a BIV is more satisfying.</i></p></blockquote>
<p>I do agree that it is more satisfying for some people, but I think this is because an error in reasoning is going on, and if we correct this error, the satisfaction goes away.</p>
<p>This is because satisfaction is rooted in knowing you are in a preferable state of affairs, and if two states are identical in every testable way, it makes no sense to say the non-BIV state of affairs is preferable.</p>
<p>I write about this in <a href="http://www.greatplay.net/essays/the-end-of-cartesian-demons" rel="nofollow">&#8220;The End of Cartesian Demons&#8221;</a>.</p>
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		<title>By: Thinking Emotions</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6674</link>
		<dc:creator>Thinking Emotions</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2011 01:07:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6674</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;blockquote&gt;Proposing to do horrible things to people is a long and respectable tradition in philosophy. Physics, too.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

LOL! Poignant observation. And your last paragraph strikes a chord with me because I&#039;ve had the exact some thoughts. You&#039;re not the only thinker to wonder if ethics has ever been thought in relation to humans, i.e., how does someone become a good person? What is a good person?

Moral internalism (agents with the conviction that X ought to be done are more motivated to do X; moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating) and externalism (moral beliefs are not intrinsically motivating; moral belief that X ought to be done has no necessary relation to motivation to do X)  get into this a little bit, but not nearly enough. I think psychology may very well be a better source to consult in determining someone&#039;s morality.

Oh yeah, to comment on BIV: doesn&#039;t it cause problems? If we&#039;re BIVs, then who&#039;s maintaining us? And if existence is just BIV, it starts a infinite causal regress.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>Proposing to do horrible things to people is a long and respectable tradition in philosophy. Physics, too.</p></blockquote>
<p>LOL! Poignant observation. And your last paragraph strikes a chord with me because I&#8217;ve had the exact some thoughts. You&#8217;re not the only thinker to wonder if ethics has ever been thought in relation to humans, i.e., how does someone become a good person? What is a good person?</p>
<p>Moral internalism (agents with the conviction that X ought to be done are more motivated to do X; moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating) and externalism (moral beliefs are not intrinsically motivating; moral belief that X ought to be done has no necessary relation to motivation to do X)  get into this a little bit, but not nearly enough. I think psychology may very well be a better source to consult in determining someone&#8217;s morality.</p>
<p>Oh yeah, to comment on BIV: doesn&#8217;t it cause problems? If we&#8217;re BIVs, then who&#8217;s maintaining us? And if existence is just BIV, it starts a infinite causal regress.</p>
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		<title>By: Alrenous</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6673</link>
		<dc:creator>Alrenous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Sep 2011 18:32:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6673</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Proposing to do horrible things to people is a long and respectable tradition in philosophy. Physics, too. 
Examples: Schrodinger&#039;s cat, indirect quantum measurement, the trolley problem.

I think in the gloves case it falls into what I&#039;ve been calling the rock-and-compilers category, which is special. I&#039;m thinking\: at what rate do pro-lifers actually forgo abortion? At what rate do Christians turn the other cheek? At what rate do atheists in fact give up worship? Do people who realize that voting is pointless usually give it up? Does showing that the EV of a lottery ticket is negative stop a person from buying them? Basically, how accurate is it to peg someone&#039;s beliefs by their actions?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Proposing to do horrible things to people is a long and respectable tradition in philosophy. Physics, too.<br />
Examples: Schrodinger&#8217;s cat, indirect quantum measurement, the trolley problem.</p>
<p>I think in the gloves case it falls into what I&#8217;ve been calling the rock-and-compilers category, which is special. I&#8217;m thinking\: at what rate do pro-lifers actually forgo abortion? At what rate do Christians turn the other cheek? At what rate do atheists in fact give up worship? Do people who realize that voting is pointless usually give it up? Does showing that the EV of a lottery ticket is negative stop a person from buying them? Basically, how accurate is it to peg someone&#8217;s beliefs by their actions?</p>
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		<title>By: joseph</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6672</link>
		<dc:creator>joseph</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Sep 2011 16:39:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6672</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;Whether people in fact normally use ideas for prediction or not is an empirical question&quot;

Can&#039;t you just do something horrible, in theory, like give a person electric shocks every other time they pull a handle that dispenses food, then give them insulating gloves and see whether they put them on every alternative time.

Or....a non-horrible version of this (bit disturbed that this occurred to me so easily).]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Whether people in fact normally use ideas for prediction or not is an empirical question&#8221;</p>
<p>Can&#8217;t you just do something horrible, in theory, like give a person electric shocks every other time they pull a handle that dispenses food, then give them insulating gloves and see whether they put them on every alternative time.</p>
<p>Or&#8230;.a non-horrible version of this (bit disturbed that this occurred to me so easily).</p>
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		<title>By: Alrenous</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6670</link>
		<dc:creator>Alrenous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Sep 2011 05:44:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6670</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Whether people in fact normally use ideas for prediction or not is an empirical question; it cannot be solved deductively. If they don&#039;t, it implies they&#039;re not using reason, that&#039;s all. 


You&#039;re suffering from the materialist auto-dismissal of emotions and consciousness. The difference between a matrix/brain-in-vat world and the real world is not physically truth-apt. However, believing you&#039;re not a BIV is more satisfying. Believing not-BIV predicts greater satisfaction, and no side effects. Therefore, BIV is truth-apt about emotions, and therefore meaningful. (Therefore, believe not-BIV, unless the opposite is true for you.)]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Whether people in fact normally use ideas for prediction or not is an empirical question; it cannot be solved deductively. If they don&#8217;t, it implies they&#8217;re not using reason, that&#8217;s all. </p>
<p>You&#8217;re suffering from the materialist auto-dismissal of emotions and consciousness. The difference between a matrix/brain-in-vat world and the real world is not physically truth-apt. However, believing you&#8217;re not a BIV is more satisfying. Believing not-BIV predicts greater satisfaction, and no side effects. Therefore, BIV is truth-apt about emotions, and therefore meaningful. (Therefore, believe not-BIV, unless the opposite is true for you.)</p>
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		<title>By: Peter Hurford</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6614</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Hurford</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Sep 2011 04:38:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6614</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;i&gt;You have successfully expanded your theory to encompass my oppositions. However, I feel that in doing this you have robbed your theory of its ability to be dialectically beneficial (to mediate opposing polarities). And this is regrettable.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;

What makes a theory dialectically beneficial?

&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;i&gt;Motivators are truth-apts, but I strongly believe that there needs to be a distinction between two types of truth-apts: The type that determine motivations; and the type that develop bodies of knowledge on the principal of those motivations. I think very few people will understand this distinction without it being made for them. Without a distinction between scales of truth-apts the idea of truth apts loses any power beyond being yet another tool of individualization.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;

I agree that the distinction is important, no worries there.  I was just arguing that they must be included under the category of truth-apt, but sure they can be a very special sub-section.

Perhaps the distinction can be made in considering the fact-value distinction, which is also very important.  Values are a type of fact, but they are very different from descriptions of the non-goal-oriented world.  Motivators to me seem to be a particular kind of value statement, which is a particular kind of truth-apt statement.

&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;i&gt;There is some stuff still to be said, but unfortunately I have to do some work stuff now. The next thing I write on my blog will be on this topic. If you don’t mind I will use your term truth-apts so there is no confusion between us as to what I am saying.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;

I&#039;m sure confusion is still possible on both of our ends, but I do look forward to further hearing your take on this topic.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><i>You have successfully expanded your theory to encompass my oppositions. However, I feel that in doing this you have robbed your theory of its ability to be dialectically beneficial (to mediate opposing polarities). And this is regrettable.</i></p></blockquote>
<p>What makes a theory dialectically beneficial?</p>
<blockquote><p><i>Motivators are truth-apts, but I strongly believe that there needs to be a distinction between two types of truth-apts: The type that determine motivations; and the type that develop bodies of knowledge on the principal of those motivations. I think very few people will understand this distinction without it being made for them. Without a distinction between scales of truth-apts the idea of truth apts loses any power beyond being yet another tool of individualization.</i></p></blockquote>
<p>I agree that the distinction is important, no worries there.  I was just arguing that they must be included under the category of truth-apt, but sure they can be a very special sub-section.</p>
<p>Perhaps the distinction can be made in considering the fact-value distinction, which is also very important.  Values are a type of fact, but they are very different from descriptions of the non-goal-oriented world.  Motivators to me seem to be a particular kind of value statement, which is a particular kind of truth-apt statement.</p>
<blockquote><p><i>There is some stuff still to be said, but unfortunately I have to do some work stuff now. The next thing I write on my blog will be on this topic. If you don’t mind I will use your term truth-apts so there is no confusion between us as to what I am saying.</i></p></blockquote>
<p>I&#8217;m sure confusion is still possible on both of our ends, but I do look forward to further hearing your take on this topic.</p>
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		<title>By: Tom</title>
		<link>http://www.greatplay.net/essays/clarifying-the-idea-of-meaning#comment-6606</link>
		<dc:creator>Tom</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2011 20:40:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.greatplay.net/?p=4860#comment-6606</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I am not sure I am reading your last sentence correctly, but besides that I think you did pretty good. 

  You have successfully expanded your theory to encompass my oppositions. However, I feel that in doing this you have robbed your theory of its ability to be dialectically beneficial (to mediate opposing polarities). And this is regrettable. I have no way to stop you from subsuming motivators under truth-apts, because you are right, what I have been calling motivators abide by the same laws that govern your truth-apts. Motivators are a type of truth-apt. That said, we were not just arguing definitions.

   The arbitrariness of definitions is one of the main tools I see you architect your thoughts with. It is a powerful and beneficial tool. I often use it myself (not as much as you). But there are other tools too, and times when they would be more useful. Definitions are arbitrary to some extent, but they are also very important. Distinction is important. If you enter a dialogue with the belief that you and the other are ultimately arguing the same thing you close yourself to the possibility of distinction, and the possibility of knowledge beyond that which you yourself create. Motivators are truth-apts, but I strongly believe that there needs to be a distinction between two types of truth-apts: The type that determine motivations; and the type that develop bodies of knowledge on the principal of those motivations. I think very few people will understand this distinction without it being made for them. Without a distinction between scales of truth-apts the idea of truth apts loses any power beyond being yet another tool of individualization.  

 There is some stuff still to be said, but unfortunately I have to do some work stuff now. The next thing I write on my blog will be on this topic. If you don&#039;t mind I will use your term truth-apts so there is no confusion between us as to what I am saying.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am not sure I am reading your last sentence correctly, but besides that I think you did pretty good. </p>
<p>  You have successfully expanded your theory to encompass my oppositions. However, I feel that in doing this you have robbed your theory of its ability to be dialectically beneficial (to mediate opposing polarities). And this is regrettable. I have no way to stop you from subsuming motivators under truth-apts, because you are right, what I have been calling motivators abide by the same laws that govern your truth-apts. Motivators are a type of truth-apt. That said, we were not just arguing definitions.</p>
<p>   The arbitrariness of definitions is one of the main tools I see you architect your thoughts with. It is a powerful and beneficial tool. I often use it myself (not as much as you). But there are other tools too, and times when they would be more useful. Definitions are arbitrary to some extent, but they are also very important. Distinction is important. If you enter a dialogue with the belief that you and the other are ultimately arguing the same thing you close yourself to the possibility of distinction, and the possibility of knowledge beyond that which you yourself create. Motivators are truth-apts, but I strongly believe that there needs to be a distinction between two types of truth-apts: The type that determine motivations; and the type that develop bodies of knowledge on the principal of those motivations. I think very few people will understand this distinction without it being made for them. Without a distinction between scales of truth-apts the idea of truth apts loses any power beyond being yet another tool of individualization.  </p>
<p> There is some stuff still to be said, but unfortunately I have to do some work stuff now. The next thing I write on my blog will be on this topic. If you don&#8217;t mind I will use your term truth-apts so there is no confusion between us as to what I am saying.</p>
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