12 Comments

1. #1 joseph says:
   6 Feb 2012, 1:08 am  

   Very interesting, heard of it on CSA.
   I think, for me, the most interesting point is that if there is a God, and this is all necessary suffering, when Theists intervene, how are they certain they aren’t interfering with God’s plan?

   Many theists, not necessarily CL, believe God inflicts punishment during the lifetime of sinners, or even for the sins of another life. The question of Mercy vs. Justice rears it’s head.

   They are enough hideous diseases out there, but what about this one; fibrodysplasia ossificans progressiva?

   Anyway, brave of you to accept the burden of proof, ganbatte and hope to read more next week.

2. #2 Thinking Emotions says:
   6 Feb 2012, 6:05 pm  

   You should consider bringing up the Euthyphro dilemma. The only consistent response I’ve seen to it is, “It’s in God’s NATURE to be good.” This would be like a defense attorney arguing against the prosecuting attorney by saying, “My client does not need to be proven innocent; he is implicitly innocent because blah blah blah.”

   However, I imagine cl has a brilliant response to it. He has a knack for thinking outside of the box in these issues. Not that you don’t, but you know what I mean. Best of luck! I’m looking forward to the discussion this will produce.

3. #3 Peter Hurford (author) says:
   6 Feb 2012, 8:15 pm  

   Joseph: I think, for me, the most interesting point is that if there is a God, and this is all necessary suffering, when Theists intervene, how are they certain they aren’t interfering with God’s plan?

   Yes, that’s a very good strategy and one I definitely intend to do.

   ~

   Joseph: Many theists, not necessarily CL, believe God inflicts punishment during the lifetime of sinners, or even for the sins of another life. The question of Mercy vs. Justice rears it’s head.

   That would be a good strategy, but CL has stated that the “wages of sin are death” and that Hell is not infinite torment, but rather just that — death.

   ~

   Joseph: They are enough hideous diseases out there, but what about this one; fibrodysplasia ossificans progressiva?

   Ow.

   ~

   Thinking Emotions: You should consider bringing up the Euthyphro dilemma. The only consistent response I’ve seen to it is, “It’s in God’s NATURE to be good.” This would be like a defense attorney arguing against the prosecuting attorney by saying, “My client does not need to be proven innocent; he is implicitly innocent because blah blah blah.”

   I do think that would be a great approach, but cl already has the Dilemma down — he argues the first horn (“moral” facts are independent of God), but thinks this is great because an omniscient God would have infinite knowledge about what these moral facts are and be able to give them to us.

   I’m completely sold on this approach to the Dilemma; I only wish God made these moral facts apparent to us, and the fact that he does not I think implies the POE.

4. #4 Thinking Emotions says:
   6 Feb 2012, 9:24 pm  

   That sounds interesting. Can you link me to an essay of his where he fleshes this out or point me to an essay of yours where he explains his perspective on the dilemma? I may have some objections, but I do not want to attack a summary.

5. #5 Peter Hurford (author) says:
   6 Feb 2012, 11:21 pm  

   The best form of his argument I would say is in his essay “A Quest For Second Best”.

6. #6 joseph says:
   7 Feb 2012, 3:34 am  

   I am kind of thinking (closest I get to thinking) if “wages of sin are death”, where does god stand on resuscitation (cpr), iron lungs, etc. If God intends people to pay their wages at a specific point in time, are we disrupting the plan (I guess it’d be for the worse) be interfering. Is it fair that in past times people died with either less chances for redemption (if they had been bad), or less testing (if they were good), I guess you could say on balance it’s the same, but perhaps we should go to more effort to prolong the lives of murderers, rapists etc, to give them a chance to repent, if you believe.

7. #7 Thinking Emotions says:
   8 Feb 2012, 9:40 pm  

   “… and the fact that he does not [make these moral facts apparent to us, I think,] implies the POE.”

   I’m inclined to agree in this case. Thanks a lot for linking me to the essay; it was a worthwhile read. Cl’s defense is solid, but I think there’s room to make the case for maltheism, or God being a malevolent bully. A being that is perfectly powerful and knowledgeable still has no apparent reason to be moral. I guess that’s one of the advantages of taking the second horn because no matter what, everything God does is good, and therefore God is good as well.

   Something else that bothers me about his argument, though it’s a far cry from being an accusation of invalidity or unsoundness, is that it does not establish moral ontology. The question of “where do ethics come from and what are they grounded in?” is still unanswered. This is yet another advantage of the second horn.

   I find it strange that only God has these answers. It just seems like a lot of faith to place into an idea. Not only is cl maintaining there is a God, but he’s maintaining that God is: (1) omniscient, (2) omnibenevolent,(3) has access to moral facts nobody else does, and 43) interprets them and relays them to his human beings honestly.

   However, I’m getting to caught up in the content when I should be focusing on the method. cl seems to think that this is the best way to go about moral discourse, and he may be right. I’m not sure if he has heard of Firthian ideal observer theory, but it’s eerily similar and espouses many of the same “how’s” cl does without assuming such a heavy load. Michael Martin dedicates an entire chapter to it in his book “Atheism, Morality, and Meaning,” and I’d like to take some notes on it and summarize the chapter. Unfortunately, I left the book in my locker at school.

   Also, in premise (D) of his syllogism, he assumes that God is omnibenevolent. This fact about God’s nature would be dictated by the repository of moral facts only God has access to, and therefore God would no longer necessarily be omnibenevolent. At least, that’s how my calculations are coming out. Not that being “inherently omnibenevolent” means much anyway, but I just thought I’d throw it out there. The first and second horn seem to lead to mutually exclusive philosophical avenues.

   I don’t know of how much use this is to you, but I thought I’d at least follow up for once and provide what I was thinking about. In the meantime, I’m going to try to find other essays of yours where I’ve started a discussion and rudely chosen not to continue on with it.

8. #8 joseph says:
   9 Feb 2012, 6:54 am  

   Well an “omnimalevolent God” could have the same level of knowledge to a set of perfect moral facts, and then do l/wish/intend the opposite…

9. #9 Thinking Emotions says:
   9 Feb 2012, 10:44 am  

   cl is going to have to demonstrate that God has some reason or motivation to be moral.

10. #10 Adamoriens says:
    9 Feb 2012, 1:15 pm  

    I find cl’s moral argument unpersuasive for the following reasons:

    If there is divine hiddenness and we use theodicies to avoid inferring God’s non-existence, it seems likely that the same theodicies which lead us to expect epistemic distance from God will lead us to expect epistemic distance from his moral deliverances.

    If we appeal to skeptical theism to avoid the defeater of divine hiddenness, we have no reason to expect moral deliverances from God.

    Either way, theism has no advantage over atheism with regard to moral knowledge.

11. #11 Peter Hurford (author) says:
    9 Feb 2012, 10:40 pm  

    Thinking Emotions: Cl’s defense is solid, but I think there’s room to make the case for maltheism, or God being a malevolent bully. A being that is perfectly powerful and knowledgeable still has no apparent reason to be moral.

    I agree. While God definitely has access to these moral facts, there is no indication that he actually puts them into practice, nor reason why we would expect he would that we could state without begging the question, based on what we know now. Too bad this will be outside the scope of my debate.

    ~

    Thinking Emotions: I guess that’s one of the advantages of taking the second horn because no matter what, everything God does is good, and therefore God is good as well.

    I’m frustrated by the second horn for a variety of reasons, mainly because it would entail that God might not be good in a way that we care about, such as in a way where there is no needless suffering. Thus I see the second horn as being so detached from the actual consequences that it becomes merely twisting definitions and employing equivocation fallacies to suit the theist’s favor.

    ~

    Thinking Emotions: The question of “where do ethics come from and what are they grounded in?” is still unanswered. This is yet another advantage of the second horn.

    Yes, though presumably ethics come from scientific facts about how to best achieve certain ends, and our ends come from God giving certain ends rationally compelling force by making us want to seek his will and thus adopt his ends. What makes his ends anything but arbitrary is a problem for either the first or second horn.

    ~

    Thinking Emotions: I’m not sure if he has heard of Firthian ideal observer theory, but it’s eerily similar and espouses many of the same “how’s” cl does without assuming such a heavy load. Michael Martin dedicates an entire chapter to it in his book “Atheism, Morality, and Meaning,” and I’d like to take some notes on it and summarize the chapter. Unfortunately, I left the book in my locker at school.

    I’d love to read your notes on the chapter sometime. I personally don’t put much stock in the ideal observer theories because they simply seem to either add an unnecessary middle man or don’t actually answer the question.

    Consider “X is moral if a perfectly rational and perfectly unbiased observer agrees X will maximize happiness”. That’s an unnecessary middle-man, because we would just get the same answer from “X is moral if X maximizes happiness”. Applying this in a biased or irrational manner just means we’re applying it incorrectly, so it’s trivial to say we need what the observer adds.

    Also consider “X is moral if a perfectly rational and perfectly unbiased observer would approve of it”. Well how does the observer himself or herself make the moral computation? Certainly he or she couldn’t follow the above statement without ending in an infinite loop. Thus the observer must have access to some other “X is moral if…” statement, and we could just appeal to that.

    ~

    Thinking Emotions: Also, in premise (D) of his syllogism, he assumes that God is omnibenevolent. This fact about God’s nature would be dictated by the repository of moral facts only God has access to, and therefore God would no longer necessarily be omnibenevolent.

    This is interesting as an accusation of circularity: cl says God’s facts are the correct moral facts because God is omnibenevolent, and we know God is omnibenevolent because God is judged that way by his moral facts.

    I’d like to see cl defend himself here. I assume it’s easy to mention God could have the correct facts about what is moral and then choose not to follow them or choose not to give them to humanity, as I would argue that he does (should he exist).

    ~

    Also to people who have commented here: if you email me (peter@greatplay.net) your email address, I’ll respond with a copy of my finished first draft of my opening statement, and you can proof read it for me / give me feedback in private. I could use the help.

12. #12 cl says:
    9 Feb 2012, 11:48 pm  

    Thanks guys, I really dig all the thought-provocation that’s going on as a result. I just wanted to leave a brief note to let you know I’m watching from the sidelines, and will be jumping back into things full force soon.

    Thanks for these opportunities, I hope all is well.

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